General Parker v. Scheck Mechanical, Corp.
772 F.3d 502
7th Cir.2014Background
- General Parker, an African American, filed EEOC charge claiming he was fired due to race and for complaining about racial discrimination; EEOC issued right-to-sue letter addressed to “Scheck Industries.”
- Parker, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued using various names (Scheck Mechanical, Scheck Industrial, “Scheck Corporation”) and instructed the Marshals to serve David O’Sullivan, registered agent for both Scheck Mechanical and Scheck Industrial.
- The clerk entered default against Scheck Mechanical after no timely answer; Scheck Mechanical moved to set aside the default, explaining an insurer-processing error and asserting two defenses: (1) it never employed Parker and (2) Title VII claims were untimely.
- District court vacated the default, then granted summary judgment for Scheck Mechanical reasoning Parker had sued the wrong corporate entity and had not pierced the corporate veil; the court did not address Parker’s requests to serve or add Scheck Industrial.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit held the default vacation was proper but reversed summary judgment, concluding the complaint and service implicated both Scheck entities, amendment or relation-back would be appropriate, and factual disputes remain about the companies’ separateness and employment responsibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion in vacating default | Default should stand because defendant was served and failed to answer | Default should be set aside due to insurer error and meritorious defenses | No abuse; vacatur proper (Rule 55(c)) |
| Whether plaintiff sued the correct corporate defendant / service sufficiency | Complaint and EEOC materials show plaintiff intended to sue Scheck Industrial and Scheck Mechanical; service on shared agent adequate | Plaintiff sued only Scheck Mechanical; no service on Scheck Industrial | Reversed: complaint and service implicated both entities; plaintiff should be allowed to proceed against Scheck Industrial |
| Whether leave to amend to add Scheck Industrial was required and should be denied for lack of motion/proposed pleading | Pro se filings and communications put defendants on notice; leave to amend or relate-back proper | Plaintiff failed to file formal motion or proposed amended complaint | District court abused discretion by not permitting amendment or curing service; amendment/relate-back appropriate |
| Whether summary judgment was proper on ground that Scheck Mechanical never employed Parker | Corporate separateness disputed; evidence (website, overlapping officers, Peach’s inconsistent affidavits) creates material factual issues | Affidavits assert Parker employed by Scheck Industrial, not Scheck Mechanical; thus summary judgment appropriate | Reversed: genuine factual disputes and deficient summary-judgment proof; summary judgment improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625 (7th Cir.) (standard for vacating default under Rule 55(c))
- Sun v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 473 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.) (factors for setting aside default)
- Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir.) (naming party in caption creates presumption of party status)
- Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (Sup. Ct.) (relation-back and notice for adding defendants)
- Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249 (7th Cir.) (liability where corporate formalities are ignored)
- Mid-Continent Wood Products, Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297 (7th Cir.) (service and effect of service on registered agent)
- MMG Financial Corp. v. Midwest Amusements Park, LLC, 630 F.3d 651 (7th Cir.) (movant’s initial burden on summary judgment)