GENERAL MOTORS, LLC v. BUCHANAN, 313 Ga. 811

Plaintiff Robert Buchanan sued General Motors, LLC for wrongful death, alleging a defective steering-wheel angle sensor in a 2007 Chevrolet Trailblazer caused his wife’s fatal accident.
Buchanan noticed the deposition of GM CEO Mary Barra, citing her congressional testimony and public statements about GM’s safety programs (including “Speak Up for Safety”).
GM moved for a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26(c), submitting Barra’s affidavit that she lacked personal, unique knowledge about the Trailblazer sensor or related investigations and arguing the deposition could be obtained by less intrusive means; GM relied on the federal “apex doctrine.”
The trial court denied the protective order (ordered a 3-hour deposition in Detroit), and the Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting mandatory application of the apex doctrine.
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide what factors a trial court should consider when a protective order seeks to bar a high-ranking officer’s deposition and which party bears the burden of proof.
The Court held that trial courts should consider apex-related factors (executive rank, lack of unique personal knowledge, availability of information from other sources) but decline to adopt a rule that creates a presumption or shifts the burden away from the movant; it vacated and remanded because the trial court failed to fully consider GM’s apex-based arguments.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Georgia should adopt the apex doctrine as a rule that presumptively protects high-ranking executives from deposition	Buchanan: No special rule needed; discovery is broad under OCGA § 9-11-26(b)	GM: Adopt apex doctrine (or variant) to bar/limit CEO depositions when CEO lacks unique knowledge	Court: Declined to adopt apex as a prescriptive or burden-shifting rule; courts may consider apex factors but no special presumption
Whether the trial court erred by refusing to apply apex-related considerations when ruling on GM’s protective order	Buchanan: Trial court permissibly rejected apex as mandatory	GM: Trial court failed to consider apex factors showing good cause for protection	Court: Trial court must consider apex factors and any other evidence of "good cause"; here it failed to fully do so; vacated and remanded
Which party bears the burden of proof on a motion for protective order involving a high-ranking executive	Buchanan: Burden should remain on movant seeking protection	GM: Sought a rule that effectively shifts burden to party seeking the deposition	Court: Movant seeking protection bears the burden to show good cause under OCGA § 9-11-26(c); no burden-shifting presumption permitted

Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Louisiana Forum Corp., 273 Ga. 206 (Ga. 2000) (Georgia law favors broad discovery under the Civil Practice Act)
Bowden v. The Medical Center, Inc., 297 Ga. 285 (Ga. 2015) (trial courts should interpret relevance broadly in discovery)
Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to adopt apex doctrine as a presumption and requiring particularized factual showing)
Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing trial court discretion to limit depositions but not formalizing an apex rule)
Thomas v. Int'l Bus. Machines, 48 F.3d 478 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding protective order where corporate chairman lacked personal knowledge)
Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App. 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (conclusory statements insufficient to establish good cause for protective order)