General Drivers & Helpers Union v. County of Douglas
291 Neb. 173
| Neb. | 2015Background
- Union, Douglas County, and County Engineer covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) effective 2010–2013 that sets pay scales for job classifications (Article 31) with columns labeled "Start," "Step 2," etc.
- For Equipment Mechanic II, the CBA pay chart lists "Start" = $19.44/hour and up to Step 8 = $23.98/hour.
- County posted a vacancy with a salary range and hired Randy Nickell on December 3, 2013 as Equipment Mechanic II at $22.05/hour (Step 5).
- Union grieved, arguing the CBA requires all new hires to be paid the "Start" rate (minimum step) and that County violated the CBA by hiring above Start.
- District court granted summary judgment for County, holding "Start" unambiguous as the beginning of a negotiable pay range and the management-rights clause permitted the County to set initial hire step within that range. Union appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "Start" in Article 31 requires all new hires be paid the Start (minimum) wage | "Start" unambiguously means mandatory starting wage for every new hire in the classification | "Start" denotes the first step of a pay scale; employer may set a new hire's step within the range | Held: "Start" unambiguous as simply the start of the pay scale; County may set initial step within the range |
| Whether the CBA is ambiguous on the meaning of "Start" | Reasonable minds could read "Start" as mandatory new-hire wage | CBA construed as whole supports County's reading; no ambiguity exists | Held: No ambiguity; question resolved as matter of law |
| Whether the management-rights clause allows County discretion to set initial hire wage | Union: pay-setting for new hires is a mandatory CBA term and requires bargaining | County: clause reserves management authority to set terms and conditions of employment not expressly limited by the CBA, including initial hire step within the bargained range | Held: Management-rights clause, read with the pay chart and vacancy posting provision, gives County discretion to set starting step within the charted range |
| Whether summary judgment was proper on the meaning of the CBA | Union: genuine issue of material fact on contract meaning/ambiguity | County: no genuine issue of material fact; meaning is question of law | Held: Summary judgment affirmed — meaning of term is a legal question and CBA is unambiguous |
Key Cases Cited
- Gary’s Implement v. Bridgeport Tractor Parts, 270 Neb. 286 (2005) (contract interpretation principles)
- Davenport Ltd. Partnership v. 75th & Dodge I, L.P., 279 Neb. 615 (2010) (contract construction and meaning)
- Beveridge v. Savage, 285 Neb. 991 (2013) (ambiguity standard for contracts)
- Hearst-Argyle Prop. v. Entrex Comm. Servs., 279 Neb. 468 (2010) (contract construed as whole; plain meaning)
- Kercher v. Board of Regents, 290 Neb. 428 (2015) (use of ordinary meaning and whole-contract construction)