Gene E. Nevils a/k/a Gene E. Edwards v. State of Tennessee
M2016-00686-CCA-R3-PC
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Mar 1, 2017Background
- In 2014 Gene E. Nevils (a/k/a Gene E. Edwards) was indicted for sale of a Schedule II substance (and a related school-zone count) after a confidential informant purchased crack cocaine; forensic testing showed >0.5 grams. Nevils initially proceeded to trial but, after the first day when the CI and an officer testified, negotiated a plea and pleaded guilty to sale of 0.5+ grams of cocaine. He was sentenced to 12 years (35% release eligibility) plus a consecutive 6-year sentence in a related case.
- Nevils later filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging his plea was not knowing/voluntary and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance (failed to explain right to appeal, discovery/investigation results, and defenses; coerced plea).
- At the post-conviction hearing Nevils testified he was pressured by family and the investigator, had poor literacy, did not review discovery, and would not have pleaded but for family pressure; he also acknowledged telling the trial court at the plea hearing that he understood the rights he was waiving and was satisfied with counsel.
- Trial counsel testified he reviewed discovery and recordings with Nevils (despite a contentious relationship), used a private investigator to probe the CI’s credibility, negotiated plea offers after assessing the strength of the State’s evidence, and went over the plea agreement line-by-line with Nevils before signing.
- The post-conviction court found the plea voluntary and counsel’s performance constitutionally adequate; the court emphasized the guilty-plea colloquy, counsel and investigator testimony, and the strength of the State’s case (CI identification and recording). Nevils appealed; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to review discovery/investigation and to present a defense | Nevils: counsel did not explain discovery/investigation results or defenses and therefore performed deficiently | State: counsel reviewed discovery, used an investigator, developed impeachment strategy for CI, was prepared for trial and negotiated a favorable plea | Held: Counsel’s performance was within reasonable professional norms; petitioner failed to prove deficiency or prejudice |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to explain right to appeal | Nevils: counsel failed to explain right to appeal | State: trial colloquy and plea paperwork show Nevils was informed and acknowledged waiver of appeal rights | Held: No merit; record and colloquy show Nevils understood appeal waiver |
| Whether plea was involuntary/coerced (family and counsel pressure) | Nevils: plea resulted from pressure by family, investigator, and counsel; he had literacy limits and did not understand plea | State: plea was Nevils’s choice after consultation; trial court’s colloquy shows he understood consequences | Held: Plea was knowing and voluntary; petitioner’s in-court plea statements and supporting testimony accord with voluntariness |
| Whether, but for counsel’s alleged failures, Nevils would have insisted on trial (prejudice for plea-case) | Nevils: would have gone to trial if properly advised and informed | State: evidence against Nevils was strong; counsel secured a plea substantially better than potential exposure; no reasonable probability of different result | Held: Petitioner failed to show reasonable probability he would have refused plea and prevailed at trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two‑prong test)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice standard for ineffective assistance in plea context)
- Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (solicitous weight to in‑court plea statements)
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (standard for voluntary and intelligent plea)
- Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897 (plea involuntariness principles under Tennessee law)
- Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (deference to trial court credibility findings in plea challenges)
- Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572 (standards for reviewing guilty plea voluntariness in Tennessee)
- Burns v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453 (strong presumption of reasonableness for defense counsel)
- Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (competence standard for criminal counsel)
- House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508 (strategy/deference and preparation requirement)
- Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (context for assessing counsel effectiveness)
- Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276 (note that alternative strategies do not alone show ineffectiveness)