807 F.3d 46
2d Cir.2015Background
- On Feb. 21, 2011, Paul Gemmink was found unconscious and injured (rib and transverse process fractures) near the Kokomo–Northwest Passage intersection at Jay Peak ski resort; he could not recall the incident.
- Gemmink (pro se) and his daughter observed a ski jump near the intersection and hypothesized another skier launched from the jump and collided with Gemmink from right to left.
- Gemmink sued Jay Peak for negligence, alleging the resort negligently maintained dangerous jumps that caused his collision and injuries.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for Jay Peak, concluding Gemmink failed to show that any alleged negligence caused his injuries.
- On appeal, the Second Circuit assumed arguendo that Jay Peak’s maintenance of jumps could constitute negligence but reviewed whether Gemmink produced sufficient evidence of causation to submit the case to a jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gemmink produced sufficient evidence of causation to survive summary judgment | Gemmink: placement of jumps and injury pattern make it more likely than not that a jumper collided with him | Jay Peak: causal link is speculative; no evidence that jump caused the collision | Held: Insufficient evidence of causation; summary judgment for Jay Peak affirmed |
| Whether the burden of proof shifts because defendant has superior access to facts | Gemmink: resort in better position to explain events near jumps | Jay Peak: no superior access; neither party has greater knowledge | Held: Neutral — neither party had superior access to facts |
| Whether Vermont law favors plaintiffs in sport-injury causation disputes | Gemmink: policy should favor injured skiers | Jay Peak: assumption of risk and comparative framework limit recovery | Held: Vermont law is essentially neutral/symmetrically indifferent on error allocation |
| Whether lay evidence (injury pattern, jump location) suffices without expert testimony | Gemmink: lay inference from injury and jump placement is adequate | Jay Peak: link is obscure; expert proof required to avoid speculation | Held: Lay evidence alone was speculative; expert evidence lacking, so causation not established |
Key Cases Cited
- Amerex Group, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2012) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14 (2d Cir. 1995) (nonmoving party must present evidence on essential elements)
- Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2015) (drawing inferences for nonmoving party at summary judgment)
- Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920) (circumstantial causation and ordinary-result inference)
- Griffen v. Manice, 166 N.Y. 188 (N.Y. 1901) (res ipsa loquitur and allocation of evidentiary burden)
- Williams v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2006) (burden-shifting where defendant has superior access to facts)
- Williams v. KFC Nat. Mgmt. Co., 391 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2004) (consideration of error direction in causation analysis)
- Human Rights Comm’n v. LaBrie, Inc., 668 A.2d 659 (Vt. 1995) (expert testimony generally required where causation is obscure)