GEICO Casualty Company, Geico General Insurance Company, GEICO Indemnity a/k/a GEICO Direct, as Subrogee of Fonda Magee v. Bennie Stapleton, 315 So.3d 464

Background

GEICO obtained a default judgment against Bennie Stapleton in 2004–2005 (~$20,000) and attempted collection; Stapleton later challenged service and the default judgment was set aside on December 29, 2016; GEICO’s suit was dismissed February 6, 2017.
Stapleton sued GEICO on January 8, 2018 alleging abuse of process, negligent and tortious collection efforts, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of commercial driving privileges, lost wages, and emotional harm.
GEICO moved to dismiss, arguing Stapleton’s intentional-tort claims were time‑barred under the one‑year statute in Miss. Code § 15‑1‑35.
The circuit court denied dismissal, reasoning Stapleton’s claims could have accrued as late as February 6, 2017, making the January 8, 2018 complaint timely under a one‑year or three‑year period depending on statute applied; GEICO sought interlocutory appeal.
The Supreme Court concluded that intentional and other torts not specifically enumerated in § 15‑1‑35 are governed by the general three‑year statute (§ 15‑1‑49), overruled Jones to that extent, held Stapleton’s claims accrued at the latest when the default was set aside (Dec. 29, 2016), and affirmed the denial of GEICO’s motion to dismiss.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the one‑year statute in § 15‑1‑35 applies to intentional torts not enumerated (e.g., abuse of process, IIED)	Stapleton argued his claims are governed by the general three‑year statute (§ 15‑1‑49) or otherwise timely	GEICO argued Jones controls and § 15‑1‑35’s one‑year period applies to intentional torts	Court overruled Jones to the extent it expanded § 15‑1‑35; non‑enumerated torts fall under § 15‑1‑49 (three years) and Stapleton’s claims survive dismissal
When did the causes of action accrue?	Stapleton said accrual occurred at latest when GEICO’s suit was dismissed/set aside (Dec. 29, 2016 / Feb. 6, 2017), making his Jan. 8, 2018 filing timely	GEICO implied accrual occurred earlier (around entry of the default judgment), which would bar suit	Court held accrual occurred at the latest when the default judgment was set aside (Dec. 29, 2016); Jan. 8, 2018 is within three years
Whether negligence claims were pleaded and preserved	Stapleton pointed to multiple negligence allegations and a civil cover sheet identifying negligence as primary cause	GEICO contended negligence was not pled and was raised first on appeal	Court found negligence pleaded and GEICO failed to attack them below, so may not raise that issue for first time on appeal
Proper interpretation of interplay between §§ 15‑1‑35 through 15‑1‑49	Stapleton (and Norman precedent) urged that enumerated statutes control and non‑enumerated claims fall under the general clause (§ 15‑1‑49)	GEICO relied on Jones precedent expanding § 15‑1‑35 to include intentional torts not listed	Court returned to Norman’s approach: statutory text and enumeration control; general three‑year clause governs non‑enumerated torts

Key Cases Cited

Jones v. Fluor Daniel Servs. Corp., 32 So. 3d 417 (Miss. 2010) (earlier decision that applied § 15‑1‑35’s one‑year period to intentional torts; court overruled to that extent)
Norman v. Bucklew, 684 So. 2d 1246 (Miss. 1996) (original interpretation treating non‑enumerated emotional‑distress claims under the general statute; Court returns to this view)
S.W. Drug Co. v. Howard Bros. Pharmacy of Jackson, Inc., 320 So. 2d 776 (Miss. 1975) (principle that statutes enumerating subjects are construed to exclude those not mentioned)
Hervey v. MetLife Gen. Ins. Corp. Sys. Agency of Miss., Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 909 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (district court critique of Norman’s treatment of intentional vs. negligent IIED; discussed in Jones)
Trustmark Nat’l Bank v. Meador, 81 So. 3d 1112 (Miss. 2012) (cited on limitations for certain torts and referenced in analysis)