Geer v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Pinellas County)
8:21-cv-01716
| M.D. Fla. | Sep 4, 2025Background
- Geer, a Florida fire chief, was convicted by a jury of sexual battery, lewd and lascivious battery, and unlawful sexual activity with a minor; state court imposed life plus concurrent and consecutive terms. State appellate court affirmed.
- The victim described prolonged sexual abuse beginning in childhood; investigators recorded a controlled phone call in which Geer apologized and did not deny the abuse. Other documentary searches and videos yielded limited inculpatory physical evidence.
- Geer pursued multiple state postconviction attacks (ineffective-assistance, suppression, fraud at evidentiary hearing, Rule 3.850 and 3.800 motions); most were denied or dismissed as untimely; several tolling events affected AEDPA timing.
- He filed a federal § 2254 petition, later a second amended petition that added Ground Six (suppression claim based on postconviction evidentiary hearing recordings). The district court concluded Ground Six was time‑barred and adjudicated other ineffective-assistance claims on the merits.
- The district court denied the § 2254 petition in full, refused an evidentiary hearing (record refuted claims), and denied a certificate of appealability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to move to suppress controlled phone call (Ground One) | Agents violated Georgia law and lacked jurisdiction; counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress; Martinez excuses state‑court default | Florida law governs (statements originated in FL) and §934.03(2)(c) authorized the recording; Georgia suppression unavailable in FL; Martinez inapplicable because claim meritless | Claim procedurally barred/meritless — Florida law permitted the interception; counsel not ineffective; Martinez does not save the defaulted claim |
| Failure to object to agents’ credibility opinion testimony (Ground Two) | Counsel should have objected to agents’ opinion testimony about victim’s truthfulness | Counsel reasonably used the testimony to impeach and highlight inconsistencies; objecting would have been strategic and futile against the controlled call admissions | Denied — no deficient performance shown and no Strickland prejudice given incriminating controlled‑call admissions |
| Failure to introduce text messages, audio recording, Tumblr posts (Ground Three) | These items would impeach the victim and show motive/inconsistency | Evidence largely cumulative, some postings incriminating; counsel reasonably avoided opening door to worse material; Pinholster bars new evidence not presented at state court | Denied — counsel’s choices reasonable; no Strickland prejudice; new‑evidence arguments procedurally defaulted and/or barred by Pinholster |
| Failure to call six witnesses (Ground Four) | Proposed witnesses would show motive to fabricate and corroborate defense (union/FDLE concerns, narcotics probe, statements about ruining Geer) | Much testimony would be hearsay or inadmissible; witness proof would not overcome the controlled‑call admissions and other inculpatory evidence | Denied — testimony largely inadmissible or would not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome |
| Amendment adding suppression claim at evidentiary hearing (Ground Six) | Newly alleged suppression of four recordings at postconviction evidentiary hearing | Claim asserted after AEDPA limitations and does not relate back to original petition | Dismissed as time‑barred under Mayle/Mungin; also meritless as defects in state collateral proceedings are not habeas grounds |
| Cumulative error & COA | Aggregation of alleged errors undermined trial fairness; seeks COA | Individual claims lack merit so cumulative claim fails; no substantial showing of denial of constitutional right | Denied — no meritorious individual errors; COA denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA deference framework)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA and Strickland combined deference)
- Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005) (relation‑back rule for amended habeas claims)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (when ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse procedural default)
- Pinkney v. Sec’y, Dep’t Corrs., 876 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2017) (deference to state law construction when ineffective‑assistance claim turns on state law)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal habeas review under §2254(d)(1) limited to state‑court record)
- Mungin v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t Corrs., 89 F.4th 1308 (11th Cir. 2024) (Mayle application; new claim must share core operative facts)
- Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118 (2022) (standard for §2254(d)(2) unreasonable factual determination)
- Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009) (doubly deferential review of ineffective assistance claims)
- Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (no evidentiary hearing where record refutes habeas assertions)
- Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 2002) (finality for AEDPA tic starts after certiorari period)