2017 Ohio 5859
Ohio Ct. App.2017Background
- Gaydosh was a Trumbull County Sanitary Engineer employee (2004–2010) covered by a CBA between the County and AFSCME Local 2493.
- He was indicted in April 2010 on criminal and workers’ compensation-related charges, later received intervention in lieu of conviction and the charges were dismissed/sealed.
- Gaydosh was terminated May 26, 2010, filed a grievance and authorized the Union to represent him; the County denied the grievance in July 2010.
- The Union declined to pursue arbitration in April–June 2012; Gaydosh filed an unfair labor practice charge with SERB which was dismissed, and did not appeal SERB’s dismissal.
- Gaydosh filed suit in 2015 for breach of contract and moved to compel arbitration; the trial court denied the motion, later granted the County summary judgment, and Gaydosh appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to compel arbitration under the CBA and R.C. 4117.03(A)(5) | Gaydosh: Cites CBA Art.20§10 and statute to argue employees may present grievances and pursue arbitration without union intervention | County: Appeal of denial was untimely and, in any event, Gaydosh authorized the Union so lacks standing to compel arbitration | Court: Appeal of the earlier denial was timely under App.R.4(B)(5); but Gaydosh lacks standing because he authorized the Union to represent him and the union-controlled grievance belongs to the union |
| Right to sue for breach of the CBA / availability of judicial remedy despite arbitration clause (R.C. 4117.09(B)(1)) | Gaydosh: Argues he is an intended third-party beneficiary and can sue the County for breach under the statute | County: The CBA provides final and binding arbitration, making the grievance procedure the exclusive remedy under R.C. 4117.10(A) | Court: The CBA’s binding arbitration clause makes the grievance procedure exclusive; summary judgment for County affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Loopco Indus., Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 64 (1993) (summary judgment should be entered with circumspection)
- Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116 (1980) (trial court may not weigh evidence or choose among reasonable inferences on summary judgment)
- Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356 (1992) (all doubts on summary judgment resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for resolving whether a factual dispute requires a jury at summary judgment)
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (1996) (appellate review of summary judgment is de novo)