GAVIN D. CADDY v. SUE-ANN N. ROBINSON, 20-0894

In late 2016 the former wife filed for divorce and separately petitioned for a domestic-violence (DV) injunction alleging multiple pre-2016 physical incidents (pushing, being hit by a door/door knob, pushed into a glass mirror) and later threatening/harassing conduct.
A default DV injunction was previously entered but later vacated for lack of notice; a new 2020 hearing was held on the 2016 petition.
At the 2020 hearing the court found the former wife credible and concluded she was a victim of domestic violence based on the pre-2016 incidents (the court did not base relief on imminent danger).
The DV court’s final injunction granted the former wife temporary 100% timesharing and sole decision-making for the minor children.
The family court previously approved a 2018 timesharing arrangement (providing Appellant specified parenting time) in the dissolution proceedings.
On appeal the Fourth District affirmed the injunction generally (evidence sufficient) but reversed the timesharing award as conflicting with the family court’s jurisdiction and order; the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Robinson)	Defendant's Argument (Caddy)	Held
1. Was there competent, substantial evidence to grant the DV injunction?	Testimony of physical assaults and threats established she was a victim of DV.	Evidence insufficient or remote; challenged issuance and certain evidentiary rulings.	Yes. Court found competent, substantial evidence supported finding she was a DV victim; injunction proper.
2. May a DV court award 100% timesharing that conflicts with a family-court custody order?	DV statute allows temporary 100% timesharing in an injunction.	DV court usurped family court; chapter 61 family-court orders control custody matters.	No. Timesharing portion reversed—family-court orders under chapter 61 take precedence; DV temporary orders cannot conflict.
3. Can the injunction be modified/dissolved later because the conduct is remote?	Injunction should remain because court found prior victimization.	May move to modify/dissolve due to remoteness and lack of recent incidents.	Court noted Appellant may move to modify/dissolve; a court can modify/dissolve if the underlying scenario no longer exists.

Achurra v. Achurra, 80 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (review standard and injunction entitlement analysis)
Puskar v. Puskar, 29 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (petitioner bears burden of competent, substantial evidence)
In re A.B., 186 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (dismissal required absent competent, substantial evidence)
Cleary v. Cleary, 711 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (family-court chapter 61 orders control custody over conflicting DV injunction provisions)
O’Neill v. Stone, 721 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (DV proceedings should not replace family-court custody litigation; temporary orders preferred)
Spano v. BB ex rel. Bruce, 947 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (similar caution against using DV forum as primary custody forum)
Bush v. Henney, 175 So. 3d 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (injunction may be modified/dissolved if underlying scenario no longer exists)
Alkhoury v. Alkhoury, 54 So. 3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (modification/dissolution principles for stale conduct)
Colarusso v. Lupetin, 28 So. 3d 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (same)