Gaulden v. Green
319 Ga. App. 84
Ga. Ct. App.2012Background
- Decedent Deloris Gaulden died in LRMC's emergency department after presenting with chest pain and undergoing a delayed workup and resuscitation efforts (EKG performed at 2:58 p.m.; CPR started 3:19 p.m.; pronounced dead 6:05 p.m.).
- Plaintiff, as administratrix, sued multiple defendants including Dr. Herrington, Medical Director of LRMC's Emergency Department, for wrongful death and survival damages.
- The complaint alleged Dr. Herrington breached supervisory duties by failing to ensure proper training and implementation of ED policies, including Chest Pain Standing Orders.
- Dr. Herrington had been Medical Director since June 2008 under a Medical Director Agreement detailing duties to monitor, supervise, and educate ED staff and ensure adherence to hospital policies.
- There was evidence of standing orders allowing nurses to initiate actions (e.g., a stat EKG) without physician approval, but staff and physicians testified to confusion about whether nurses could initiate such orders, raising supervisory responsibilities.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to Herrington on professional negligence (no physician-patient relationship) and ordinary negligence (duties framed as medical judgment). The appellate court reverses on the professional negligence claim but affirms on ordinary negligence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty to decedent without privity | Gaulden: Herrington owed a legal duty via Medical Director duties. | Herrington: no physician-patient relationship, no duty absent Anderson-based third-party beneficiary. | Duty exists via independent supervisory duty under Gray/U.S. Restatement 324A. |
| Professional vs ordinary negligence | Allegations against Herrington involve supervision of ED policies (professional). | Supervision involves medical judgment; claims fall outside ordinary negligence. | Professional negligence claim viable; ordinary negligence claim grants affirmed. |
| Third-party beneficiary reliance | Plaintiff contends third-party beneficiary theory supports duty. | Herrington relies on Anderson to avoid duty. | Anderson distinguished; Gray controls; duty found independent of privity. |
| Applicability of Chest Pain Standing Orders | Failure to train on standing orders breached supervisory duty. | Standing orders are administrative; require medical judgment. | Allegations regarding training and implementation involve professional rather than ordinary negligence. |
| Scope of supervisory duty | Medical Director duties include training and policy dissemination. | Duty limited to general supervision; not a patient-specific duty. | Court recognizes a narrow supervisory duty tied to the Medical Director Agreement and ED training. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gray v. Vaughn, 217 Ga. App. 872 (Ga. App. 1995) (supervision of triage staff can create liability for failure to supervise)
- Huggins v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co., 245 Ga. 248 (Ga. 1980) (Restatement § 324A; undertaking can create liability to third parties)
- Anderson v. Houser, 240 Ga. App. 613 (Ga. App. 1999) (on-call physician not enough; distinguish from supervisory duty case)
- Med. Center of Central Ga. v. Landers, 274 Ga. App. 78 (Ga. App. 2005) (physician-patient privity not always required)
- Peace v. Weisman, 186 Ga. App. 697 (Ga. App. 1988) (professional negligence framework in medical context)