Gateway Bank, F.S.B. v. Metaxas
A158793M
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jun 25, 2021Background
- Poppi Metaxas was Gateway Bank’s CEO and a director during the 2008–2010 regulatory crisis; OTS rated the bank a “troubled institution.”
- In March 2009 Gateway approved (a) a $3.65M “working capital” loan to Ideal and (b) a bulk sale of REO/NPLs to three buyers allegedly procured by Ideal affiliate Michael Ashley; Ideal immediately withdrew loan proceeds that funded the buyers’ down payments (a “round‑trip” transaction).
- Metaxas did not disclose known connections between Ideal/Ashley and the buyers to Gateway’s Board or to OTS; she later denied knowledge under oath; federal regulators and prosecutors investigated, and Metaxas pled guilty (2015) to conspiracy to commit bank fraud relating to these transactions.
- In November 2009 Metaxas overruled the CFO and authorized a $757,000 wire to Ideal while Ideal was under government attack; Ideal was shut down days later and Gateway suffered losses from purchased mortgage portfolios.
- Gateway sued Metaxas (fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence). A court‑appointed referee found for Gateway (2019) and awarded $250,000 as tort‑of‑another damages (attorney fees) for the fallout from the March transactions and $132,154 for the November wire; Metaxas appealed.
- On appeal the court affirmed: it rejected Metaxas’s arguments that (1) Gateway’s alleged “special benefit” from the round‑trip transaction barred tort damages and (2) she had no lawful alternative but to approve the $757,000 wire.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gateway) | Defendant's Argument (Metaxas) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether tort‑of‑another damages must be offset by any pecuniary ‘special benefit’ Gateway received from the round‑trip transactions | Award of attorney fees as tort damages was proper; any benefit may be considered but only equitably | The bank profited overall (cash inflows exceeded outflows); equity and Restatement §920 require deduction of benefits (no discretion to ignore profits) | Affirmed for Gateway: the special‑benefit offset is discretionary; referee reasonably found equities weighed against Metaxas and did not apply a deduction |
| Whether Metaxas breached fiduciary duty by approving the $757,000 wire | The wire was an imprudent, self‑interested act that caused loss; she overruled CFO and acted despite directives to cease funding Ideal | The funds were Ideal’s; she had no practical or legal option but to let Ideal withdraw its money, so no additional causation/damage from her approval | Affirmed for Gateway: referee reasonably found breach of fiduciary duty and causation; Metaxas’s proffered counsel advice and necessity defense were rejected |
| Standard of appellate review for equity decisions about mitigation under special‑benefit doctrine | Trial court’s equitable choice reviewed for abuse of discretion | — | Abuse‑of‑discretion standard applies; referee’s conclusions sustained absent irrationality |
| Whether damages were limited to cash flows so netting is required | Gateway alleged non‑monetary harms (reputational, regulatory costs) beyond cash flows; these supported denial of netting | Metaxas argued cash is fungible and netting of inflows/outflows is the correct measure | Court accepted non‑monetary harms and that mitigation is not automatic; netting was not required here |
Key Cases Cited
- Maben v. Rankin, 55 Cal.2d 139 (1961) (special‑benefit value may be considered to mitigate damages when equitable)
- Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d 220 (1982) (value of benefit considered in mitigation to extent equitable)
- Heckert v. MacDonald, 208 Cal.App.3d 832 (1989) (affirming equitable mitigation where appropriate; no automatic deduction)
- Prentice v. North American Title Guaranty Corp., 59 Cal.2d 618 (1963) (explaining tort‑of‑another doctrine: attorney fees recoverable as tort damages)
- Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, 55 Cal.4th 747 (2012) (standard for demonstrating abuse of discretion on appellate review)
- Denham v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 557 (1970) (presumption that lower‑court judgment is correct on appeal)
