Gaston v. State
307 Ga. 634
Ga.2020Background
- In November 2011 Terrance Walker was shot multiple times and died; no gun was found on his person. Three different caliber casings (.40, .38, 9mm) were recovered and a .40-caliber bullet and a .38-caliber bullet were found in Walker.
- Witnesses placed Lerenzo Gaston at or near the scene: one eyewitness (Kimberly Seaborn) identified Gaston in a police lineup but recanted at trial; another witness (Walker’s brother) saw Gaston flee; Gaston was known to carry .40 and 9mm handguns.
- Gaston had a prior altercation with Walker after a prostitution-related dispute; Gaston allegedly threatened to “shoot the place up.” Gaston later was seen telling Maegan Bostic, “I got him. You’re next.” His ex‑girlfriend Jaquita Mack testified Gaston admitted killing someone.
- Gaston was indicted and tried; jury acquitted him of malice murder but convicted him of felony murder (predicated on aggravated assault), aggravated assault (merged), and possession of a firearm during a felony. He was sentenced to life plus five years.
- On appeal Gaston argued ineffective assistance of counsel based on four alleged failures by trial counsel: (a) not requesting a justification/self‑defense jury charge; (b) not objecting to certain prosecutor closing arguments; (c) not objecting to admission of a prior consistent statement (a text) by Mack; and (d) not eliciting/exposing Seaborn’s prior interview statements that she did not see Gaston shoot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to request justification/self‑defense charge | Gaston: counsel should have requested a self‑defense instruction — slight evidence (multiple shooters, third‑party blood) supported it. | State: evidence of justification was at best slight and counsel strategically pursued misidentification; presenting conflicting defenses (misidentification vs self‑defense) risked credibility; counsel’s choice reasonable. | No ineffective assistance: no prejudice shown; justification evidence weak and counsel’s strategy reasonable. |
| Failure to object to prosecutor’s closing about a text asking for a gun | Gaston: prosecutor argued facts outside the record when asserting Gaston sent the gun text. | State: phone records in evidence and testimony that Gaston sometimes texted from other numbers permitted an inference that Gaston sent the text. | No ineffective assistance: prosecutor’s inference was permissible; objection would have been meritless. |
| Failure to object to admission of Mack’s prior consistent statement (text) | Gaston: text was hearsay/implied hearsay and Mack lacked personal knowledge when she sent it; counsel should have kept it out. | State: trial court already overruled pretrial objection; counsel need not renew; strategic decision not to draw attention to it. | No ineffective assistance: counsel had already objected; choice not to renew was reasonable trial strategy. |
| Failure to elicit Seaborn’s prior statement that she did not see shooter | Gaston: counsel failed to cross‑examine to expose that Seaborn told investigators she didn’t see Gaston shoot. | State: counsel elicited through other means that Seaborn did not see the shooting and reasonably focused cross on other witnesses; scope of cross is tactical. | No ineffective assistance: counsel introduced the favorable portion and stressed inconsistencies at closing; tactical decision was reasonable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
- Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339 (objective‑reasonableness standard for counsel performance)
- Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153 (applying Strickland framework)
- Williams v. State, 297 Ga. 460 (entitlement to instructions when slight evidence supports alternative theories)
- Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63 (slight‑evidence rule for requested charges)
- McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856 (strategic risks of inconsistent defense theories)
- Cooper v. State, 296 Ga. 728 (prosecutor permitted to draw reasonable inferences from evidence)
