Gassner v. Raynor Manufacturing Co.
948 N.E.2d 315
Ill. App. Ct.2011Background
- Gassner sustained a work-related back injury on May 30, 2000 for which fusion surgery occurred in 2002; a post-surgical staph infection developed.
- The Industrial Commission approved a settlement contract on May 1, 2002, including an open medical provision to pay certain medical expenses for one year after approval.
- After approval, Gassner incurred about $190,000 for treatment of a heart infection linked to the back-originating infection; he contends this is covered by the open medical provision.
- Gassner petitioned the Commission to enforce the settlement contract in 2003; the Commission found waiver of rights and advised seeking relief in circuit court under section 19(g).
- In 2008 Gassner filed a 19(g) petition in circuit court; RMC moved to dismiss as time-barred under 13-205 and later for summary judgment; the trial court denied dismissal but granted summary judgment for RMC.
- The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed denial of dismissal, reversed the summary judgment, and remanded to determine contract interpretation and the potential inclusion of the heart infection under the open medical provision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What statute of limitations governs section 19(g) claims? | Gassner: 10-year period (section 13-206) applies as a written contract; accrual May 1, 2003, filing Oct 31, 2008 complies. | RMC: 5-year period (section 13-205) applies as an arbitration-like award; accrual May 1, 2003; filing after five years bars claim. | 10-year limitations period applies; case not barred by 5-year limit. |
| Whether the open medical provision is ambiguous and requires extrinsic evidence. | Open medical provision includes treatment for the heart infection if related to the back injury; the term is ambiguous and warrants parol evidence. | Open medical provision unambiguously limits payment to treatment of the back, not to unrelated infections. | Ambiguity exists; extrinsic evidence may be admitted; remand to determine intent and scope. |
| Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment based on O'Brien's affidavit? | O'Brien's affidavit is inconclusive and insufficient to resolve the contract-interpretation issue; evidence should be weighed at trial. | O'Brien's affidavit shows no unpaid back-related bills; contract language controls; no factual question remains. | Trial court erred by accepting the affidavit as uncontradicted; contract-interpretation issue must be decided in the trial court. |
| Should the case be remanded for trial on contract interpretation and coverage of the heart infection? | Yes, to determine whether the heart infection was the same infection originating in the back and thus covered. | No, the language excludes such treatment from coverage. | Remand appropriate to determine the parties' intent and whether the heart infection falls within 'treatment to the low back.' |
Key Cases Cited
- Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251 (Ill. 2004) (summary judgment standard and evidentiary burden on affidavits)
- Givens v. Givens, 192 Ill. App. 3d 97 (Ill. App. 1989) (treats settlement contracts as written contracts for limitations purposes)
- Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102 (Ill. 1921) (parol evidence rule and parol evidence affecting contract term interpretation under four corners rule)
- Blacke v. Industrial Comm'n, 268 Ill. App. 3d 26 (Ill. App. 1994) (arbitration awards approved by the Commission treated as actions arising from statute with 5-year limit)
- Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457 (Ill. Supreme Court 1999) (four corners vs extrinsic ambiguity approaches to contract interpretation)
- River's Edge Homeowners' Ass'n v. City of Naperville, 353 Ill. App. 3d 874 (Ill. App. 2004) (four corners rule adherence after Air Safety; later developments in Illinois)