972 F.3d 881
6th Cir.2020Background
- In the 2019 Kentucky Derby, Maximum Security finished first but the race stewards reviewed objections and disqualified him for in-race interference, placing him seventeenth.
- The Wests (owners) sought administrative review from the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission; the Commission’s counsel replied the stewards’ disqualification decision was not subject to appeal.
- The Wests sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the stewards’ call was arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, violated procedural due process (property and liberty interests), and that the regulating rule was unconstitutionally vague.
- The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, holding (1) the stewards’ in-race disqualification is not a “final order[] of an agency” under KRS § 13B.140(1), (2) the Wests had no protected property or liberty interest in the Derby purse/trophy, and (3) the regulation was not unconstitutionally vague.
- On appeal the Sixth Circuit affirmed: the stewards’ in-race decision was not an administrative ‘‘final order’’ (it was not an administrative hearing nor made effective by the agency head), the Wests lacked a protected interest, and the vagueness claim failed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the stewards’ disqualification is a "final order" under KRS §13B.140(1) and thus judicially reviewable | Wests: steward decision is a final agency disposition subject to judicial review | Kentucky: regulation makes in-race steward findings final and non-appealable; not an administrative "final order" | Held: Not a final order — not an "administrative hearing" and not "made effective by an agency head"; thus no statutory judicial review |
| Whether the stewards’ decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence | Wests: decision lacked substantial evidence and was arbitrary | Kentucky: stewards have discretion to assess fouls and placements under the regulation | Held: Court did not reach merits because decision is not reviewable under state law |
| Whether Wests were denied procedural due process (property/liberty interests) | Wests: they had a property interest in the purse/trophy and a liberty interest in agency following its regulations | Kentucky: racing privileges are discretionary; regulations confer steward discretion and owners relinquish entitlement | Held: No protected property or liberty interest; no due process violation |
| Whether the regulating rule is unconstitutionally vague | Wests: rule is vague and permits arbitrary enforcement | Kentucky: rule provides sufficient standards and stewards’ discretion is lawful | Held: Vagueness claim fails because Wests lack a protected interest triggering due process protection |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: courts need plausible factual allegations and need not accept legal conclusions)
- Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (property interests are defined by state law, not the Constitution)
- Med Corp., Inc. v. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2002) (no property interest where award is wholly discretionary)
- EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2012) (party cannot have a property interest in a discretionary benefit)
- Tomaszczuk v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 2018) (must show deprivation of protected interest to raise vagueness challenge)
- United States v. Simpson, 520 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (federal courts predict how state supreme court would rule; intermediate appellate decisions are persuasive)
- Higgins v. Kentucky Sports Radio, LLC, 951 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2020) (acknowledging that officials’ calls can change outcomes in sports contexts)
- Torres v. Vitale, 954 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2020) (district court dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) reviewed de novo)
- Lomax v. Ortiz‑Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020) (metaphor that judges are like umpires in assessing reviewability of sporting decisions)
