Gary Sleeper v. Donald R. Loring
83 A.3d 769
Me.2013Background
- North Sebago Shores subdivision created in 1955; lots designated by Arabic and Roman numerals on recorded plan; perimeter road conveyed to Town in 1970.
- In 1977, Bernstein and Smith quitclaimed the parent parcel to Benson but included two "excepting" paragraphs excluding (1) "all the Arabic numbered lots" and (2) a singularly described "parcel of land shown as a right of way" shown on a 1970 plan.
- Between 1994–1999 back-lot owners (plaintiffs) received easements over lot 40A, a 20-foot strip leading from the road to the lake; plaintiffs later built a dock on lot 40A and obtained a retroactive 1999 permit which was rescinded in 2010.
- In 2007 Benson quitclaimed lot 40A to the defendants subject to easements "to access Sebago Lake as shown on said Plan." Competing later transfers of lot 40A followed in 2012.
- Plaintiffs sued seeking declaratory relief that their easement includes the right to construct and maintain a dock; the Superior Court found Benson's 1977 deed ambiguous (admitted extrinsic evidence) but held the easement unambiguously did not permit a dock.
- On appeal the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded the 1977 deed unambiguously excepted lot 40A (so fee remained with grantors) but that the easement’s purpose is ambiguous and remanded for trial to determine whether a dock is permitted; court also directed joinder consideration of other interested parties.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Benson's 1977 deed unambiguously conveyed lot 40A | Benson's deed ambiguous; extrinsic evidence should decide whether lot 40A conveyed | Deed language (excepting Arabic-numbered lots and a single ‘‘parcel’’ right-of-way) excludes lot 40A from conveyance | Deed unambiguous: Arabic-numbered lots excluded; referenced "parcel" right-of-way refers only to the specifically titled roads and small connecting lot, so lot 40A remained with grantors |
| Whether the easement over lot 40A includes right to construct/maintain a dock | Easement to "shore" includes dock rights (historical dock, practical access needs) | "Right-of-way" and phrase "to the shore" limit use to passage only; no docking privilege explicitly granted | Ambiguous as to purpose: "to the shore" fixes terminus (ordinary high-water mark) but does not resolve whether docking is within easement; remand for trial with extrinsic evidence and overburden analysis |
| Whether the singular wording in the 1970 plan reference creates ambiguity about excluded rights-of-way | Plaintiffs: singular vs. multiple rights-of-way creates doubt whether more was excepted | Defendants: plan title and quotation use singular "parcel/right-of-way," referring to a single continuous parcel consisting of named roads | Court: singular phrasing and plan title make the exception unambiguous for the specifically named parcel |
| Whether additional parties must be joined on remand | Plaintiffs: not addressed in detail | Defendants: other back-lot owners and other fee owners may have interests in lot 40A | Court: trial court should consider joinder under M.R. Civ. P. 19(a) to protect absent parties' interests |
Key Cases Cited
- Cox v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 59 A.3d 1280 (Me. 2013) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Lloyd v. Benson, 910 A.2d 1048 (Me. 2006) (interpretation of deeds is a question of law)
- Wentworth v. Sebra, 829 A.2d 520 (Me. 2003) (give words ordinary meaning when construing deeds)
- Perry v. Buswell, 94 A. 483 (Me. 1915) (‘‘expressed intention of the parties’’ controls deed construction)
- Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690 (Me. 2009) (look at instrument as a whole; plan becomes part of deed when referenced)
- Matteson v. Batchelder, 32 A.3d 1059 (Me. 2011) (scope of easement rights must be determined from unambiguous deed language)
- Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222 (Me. 1979) (even where location is clear, deed language may not reveal full scope/purpose of right-of-way)
- Flaherty v. Muther, 17 A.3d 640 (Me. 2011) (use extrinsic evidence to ascertain original parties' intent as to easement purpose and consider overburdening analysis)