Gary Perez and Matilde Torres v. City of San Antonio, 715 S.W.3d 709

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres are members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church and perform religious ceremonies in a “Sacred Area” within Brackenridge Park, a public park owned by the City of San Antonio.
The City developed a plan to improve the park that involves removing trees and deterring migratory birds from the Sacred Area, claiming public safety and preservation reasons.
Perez filed suit, arguing the City's plan would destroy core elements essential to his religious services, seeking injunctions under various constitutional and statutory claims, including the newly added Texas Religious Services Clause (Article I, § 6-a).
The district court granted limited relief but did not enjoin the tree-removal or bird-deterrence parts of the plan; Perez appealed, and the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court regarding the meaning and scope of the Religious Services Clause.
The certified question focused on whether the Clause imposes a categorical bar against any limitation of any religious service, regardless of the government’s interest, and to what extent its scope is limited.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Religious Services Clause categorically bar all limits?	Clause categorically bars any limits on religious services, regardless of government interest.	Clause only bars unequal or non-compelling restrictions; strict scrutiny should apply.	Clause imposes a categorical bar when it applies—no balancing of interests or strict scrutiny.
What is the scope of the Religious Services Clause?	Scope is limited only by text and core interpretive principles but covers broad range of conduct.	Scope is limited; applies only to unequal treatment compared to secular activities.	Scope is not unlimited; does not extend to government preservation/management of public lands.
Does government park maintenance fall within the Clause’s bar?	Blocking trees and birds necessary to services is a prohibited limitation under the Clause.	Managing public land is not a limitation on religious services within the meaning of Clause.	Clause does NOT reach government actions preserving/managing public property.
Are traditional exceptions (e.g., emergencies) incorporated?	Clause does not bar government action in true emergencies, criminal law, or property disputes.	All rights are subject to reasonable limitation; traditional limits apply via strict scrutiny.	Some limitations (e.g., health, safety, public land use) are outside the Clause’s scope.

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (government not required to accommodate religious practices on public land if not coercive or discriminatory)
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (public park access for all, but access not absolute and subordinate to public comfort and good order)
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (religious restriction unconstitutional if not equal to secular activities)