Gary Martin v. Stephen O'Daniel
2014 SC 000373
| Ky. | Feb 15, 2017Background
- Stephen O’Daniel, a retired KSP officer, bought a Corvette he later learned had been stolen in 1981; he sought a new title and KSP investigated after title-branch concerns about fraud.
- Detectives Gary Martin and Bobby Motley (investigators) and Major Mike Sapp (supervisor) conducted the investigation and presented findings to Franklin County Commonwealth’s Attorney Larry Cleveland.
- Cleveland declined to prosecute and requested a special prosecutor be appointed; Jefferson County Commonwealth’s Attorney David Stengel was appointed and presented the case to a grand jury, which returned an indictment for second-degree forgery.
- O’Daniel was tried and acquitted; he then sued the officers for malicious prosecution alleging they procured the indictment and concealed exculpatory evidence.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for the officers, finding (1) they did not institute the prosecution and (2) they were immune (citing Rehberg). Court of Appeals reversed; Supreme Court affirmed the reversal but revised the legal standard for malicious prosecution and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers are absolutely or qualifiedly immune from malicious prosecution suit | O’Daniel: immunity does not cover investigative acts and concealment of exculpatory evidence; claim survives | Officers: Rehberg grants absolute immunity for grand-jury testimony; qualified official immunity protects them | Absolute immunity for grand-jury testimony does not shield non‑testimony investigative acts; qualified official immunity unavailable if malice is shown; summary judgment on immunity improper |
| Whether officers “instituted or procured” the proceedings (Raine’s "by, or at the instance of") | O’Daniel: officers procured the prosecution by supplying misleading information and inducing prosecutor | Officers: they did not arrest, file complaint, or procure indictment; prosecutor/grand jury initiated the charge | Court rejects narrow view; "procured" (or initiated/continued) covers conduct that induced or procured prosecution; remand to apply clarified standard |
| Proper legal standard for malicious prosecution elements in Kentucky | O’Daniel: Raine elements applied by courts should allow liability for procuring prosecution | Officers: Raine’s phrasing ("at the instance of") is ambiguous; Sykes (federal §1983 standard) improper to import | Court abandons Raine’s awkward wording in favor of Restatement framework (initiate/procure/continue; lack of probable cause; malice; favorable termination; damages) and directs remand under that standard |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate on the record facts | O’Daniel: factual disputes (malice, concealment, procurement) preclude summary judgment | Officers: absence of arrest/complaint and prosecutor testimony that he independently decided supports judgment | Court: disputed facts (malice, procurement, concealment) remain; summary judgment improper; remand for further proceedings under revised elements |
Key Cases Cited
- Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012) (Supreme Court: grand‑jury witnesses enjoy absolute immunity for grand‑jury testimony in § 1983 suits)
- Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001) (qualified official immunity protects good‑faith discretionary acts but is defeated by malice)
- Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981) (prior Kentucky articulation of malicious prosecution elements; court abrogates its phrasing)
- Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010) (federal § 1983 malicious‑prosecution elements: defendant made, influenced, or participated in decision to prosecute)
- Phat’s Bar & Grill v. Louisville–Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 918 F. Supp. 2d 654 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (applied Kentucky law and considered whether officer ‘‘set the machinery of the law in motion’’)