Garry Jones v. Thomas Bell, 801 F.3d 556

Garry Jones committed two armed robberies in Michigan, involving a gun and theft of a car and belongings.
Jones was represented by attorney Glenn; on the first day of trial he objected to counsel’s preparedness and sought self-representation, but the court denied it.
Jones did not raise Faretta self-representation on direct appeal; Michigan courts denied post-conviction relief under 6.508(D) for lack of prejudice, leaving default in place.
Jones exhausted state remedies and filed federal habeas petition arguing a Faretta violation and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause; the district court granted relief.
The Sixth Circuit reverses the district court, holding Jones procedurally defaulted, the default cannot be excused, and the state-court decisions were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Jones procedurally defaulted on his Faretta claim	Jones argues appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness excuses the default	Michigan rules required direct appeal or 6.508(D) showing prejudice; default valid	Yes, default on state grounds bars merits review
Whether appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness constitutes cause to excuse default	Appellate counsel’s performance was deficient by not raising Faretta	Performance was not deficient; it may have been a strategic choice	No, not showing deficient performance with prejudice to excuse default
Whether, on the merits, Faretta was correctly applied given timing of the request	Right to self-representation was violated because denial occurred on the day of trial	Faretta requires timeliness; a morning request can be validly denied	Not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Faretta
Whether the Michigan court’s timing-based reasoning constitutes an unreasonable application of Faretta	The timing rule should be recognized as a substantive limit to Faretta	Timing is not a per se procedural bar and state courts may assess circumstances	No, state decisions were not unreasonable in applying Faretta given timing
Whether Hill Moore/Moore v. Haviland distinctions affect this case	Moore supports relief for mid-trial self-representation	Jones did not act as swiftly; Moore is distinguishable	No, Moore distinguishable; Hill/ Faretta timing controls

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (right to self-representation requires timely request; no absolute right; timing matters)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (U.S. 1984) (self-representation denial is structural error; not harmless)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel; prejudice required)
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (U.S. 1977) (cause and prejudice standard for procedural defaults)
Ambrose v. Booker, 684 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2012) (actual prejudice required to excuse default even for structural errors)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (U.S. 2011) (highly deferential AEDPA review; not a substitute for direct appeal)
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (S. Ct. 2014) (clarifies deference to state-court factual and legal determinations)
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (U.S. 2000) (limits of Faretta right; timing considerations)