Garry Curtis v. Propel Property Tax Funding
915 F.3d 234
| 4th Cir. | 2019Background
- Curtis owed $13,734.43 in residential property taxes to Petersburg, VA, and entered a Tax Payment Agreement (TPA) with Propel under Va. Code § 58.1-3018, where Propel paid the taxes and Curtis agreed to repay with fees and interest.
- The TPA conformed to the statutory limits (origination fee, interest rate, repayment term) and expressly disclaimed any change to the locality’s tax lien arrangements.
- Curtis sued Propel (proposed class) alleging violations of TILA, EFTA, and the VCPA, claiming among other things that the TPA required preauthorized electronic fund transfers (EFTs) and contained improper EFT cancellation/stop-payment terms.
- The district court dismissed the VCPA claim but denied dismissal of Curtis’s TILA and EFTA claims, and certified for interlocutory appeal (1) standing to bring EFTA claims and (2) whether the TPAs are consumer credit transactions under TILA/EFTA.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed: (1) Curtis has Article III standing to pursue EFTA claims because he alleged concrete, particularized, and imminent injury from being required to consent to preauthorized EFTs and related EFTA waivers; (2) the TPA is a "consumer credit transaction" under TILA/EFTA because it constitutes third-party financing of a tax obligation and the financing was for a personal/household purpose.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing under EFTA | Curtis: alleging TPA made credit contingent on consenting to preauthorized EFTs and included unlawful EFT withdrawal/stop-payment terms; this is a substantive EFTA injury | Propel: Curtis did not plead that he was required to agree to EFTs or that he made/attempted to cancel EFTs, so no concrete injury | Court: Standing satisfied — alleged statutory (substantive) EFTA violations are the type of harm Congress sought to prevent; injury is particularized, concrete, and imminent |
| Whether TPA is a consumer credit transaction (TILA/EFTA applicability) | Curtis: TPA is third-party financing of tax obligation and was used to defer a residential tax payment (personal/household purpose), so TILA/EFTA apply | Propel: TPAs are statutory mechanisms, not creditor-granted credit; locality retains lien and statutory scheme differentiates TPAs from typical loans, so not "credit" or consumer transaction | Court: TPA is credit under TILA/EFTA (third-party financing per Reg. Z Staff Commentary) and is a consumer transaction (finances residential tax => personal/household purpose); TILA/EFTA govern TPAs |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (concrete, particularized, and imminent-injury requirement for Article III standing)
- Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2017) (harm must be the type Congress sought to prevent to satisfy concreteness in consumer-protection contexts)
- Billings v. Propel Fin. Servs., LLC, 821 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2016) (third-party transactions involving transfer of tax liens were held not to be TILA "credit" because obligation transferred to transferee)
- Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379 (3d Cir. 2000) (analyzed tax-lien transfer arrangements and TILA applicability)
- Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980) (deference to administrative interpretation of TILA/Regulation Z)