429 F.Supp.3d 311
E.D. Tex.2019Background:
- Collision on eastbound I-20 near Shreveport, Louisiana; a 15-year-old (Elias) with a Montana learner’s permit was driving the Hanson vehicle; Plaintiffs Adrianna Garrett and Garrett Londoff sued for negligence, vicarious liability, and negligent entrustment.
- Plaintiffs filed in the Eastern District of Texas, Marshall Division, alleging negligent entrustment occurred in that division.
- Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(3) to dismiss for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer to the Tyler Division, conceding the Eastern District is a proper district but arguing the Marshall Division is not the proper division.
- The court addressed (1) whether 28 U.S.C. § 1391 permits a divisional venue objection and (2) whether a § 1404(a) intra-district transfer to Tyler is warranted for convenience.
- Court held that § 1391 governs venue at the district level (no divisional restriction) and denied transfer under § 1404(a) because defendants failed to show Tyler was "clearly more convenient."
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1391 allows divisional challenges so Marshall Division is improper | §1391 defines proper venue by district only; divisions are not separately constrained | Marshall Division is improper because plaintiffs reside in Tyler Division and another division exists where the action could be brought | Venue proper in Marshall: §1391 is district-based; divisions are not restricted and §1393 (divisional venue) was repealed |
| Whether transfer to Tyler under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is warranted | Marshall is convenient: wreck nearer Marshall courthouse; many likely witnesses and subpoena power lie in Marshall area | Tyler is more convenient because plaintiffs and many medical providers are in Tyler and Tyler is closer to DFW for travel | Transfer denied: threshold met (Tyler would be proper), but §1404 factors mostly neutral or weigh against transfer; defendants did not show Tyler is clearly more convenient |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lauderdale Cty., 914 F.3d 960 (5th Cir. 2019) (statutory interpretation begins with statutory text)
- Weaver v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 939 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2019) (courts should not engraft provisions Congress declined to enact)
- Ramos-Portillo v. Barr, 919 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 2019) (interpretation clarified by remainder of statutory scheme)
- In re Lopez, 897 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2018) (consider entire text, structure, and relation of statutory parts)
- Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005) (Congress’ inclusion or exclusion of language indicates intent)
- Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (courts cannot rewrite statutes Congress enacted)
- Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) (courts may not rewrite statutes even for policy reasons)
- In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2013) (§1404 applies to transfers between divisions as well as between districts)
- In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2004) (threshold inquiry for transfer and applicable private/public factors)
- In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (movant must show transfer is "clearly more convenient"; factors non-exhaustive)
- Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (convenience of witnesses is the most important transfer factor)
- In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (court congestion and speed to trial relevant to public-interest factors)