Garrett Kyle Anderson v. State
A21A0452
| Ga. Ct. App. | Jun 30, 2021Background:
- Anderson locked his keys in his car at a Walmart; a locksmith, Tansu Kanlica, unlocked it and demanded $175; Anderson directed Kanlica to follow him to a SunTrust ATM.
- While Kanlica followed, Anderson drove erratically (turns, U-turns, lane changes); Kanlica followed and later lost control, striking three teenage pedestrians; two died and one was severely injured.
- Anderson was tried and convicted of two counts of first‑degree vehicular homicide, serious injury by vehicle, and aggressive driving; the trial included expert accident reconstruction and a 911 call recording from Kanlica.
- The State introduced OCGA § 24‑4‑404(b) evidence: two prior speeding convictions and two Vine videos showing Anderson engaging in racing/drifting talk; Anderson objected as impermissible propensity evidence.
- Anderson sought to introduce (a) evidence of a 2013 incident in which Kanlica allegedly tried to abduct a girl, (b) post‑trial testimony from Kanlica (who later invoked the Fifth), and (c) testimony from Alan Carlton recounting alleged statements by Kanlica; trial court excluded this evidence and denied motions to strike; Anderson appealed.
Issues:
| Issue | Anderson's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of 404(b) evidence (prior speeding convictions and Vine videos) | Evidence was offered to show propensity and thus inadmissible | Evidence relevant to intent and knowledge for reckless/aggressive driving; probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice; limiting instruction given | Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion; evidence admissible for intent/knowledge and not unduly prejudicial |
| Exclusion of Kanlica’s 2013 attempted abduction evidence | Showed Kanlica’s motive/bent of mind, intent to steal/flight, and that Kanlica would overcharge or flee | Evidence sought to prove propensity; not relevant to whether Anderson brake‑checked or eluded; highly prejudicial | Affirmed — exclusion proper; lack of relevance and undue prejudice made it inadmissible |
| Motion to strike Kanlica’s trial testimony after Kanlica invoked Fifth at new‑trial hearing | Kanlica’s refusal to testify at the hearing denied Anderson the right to further cross‑examine; trial testimony should be stricken | Witness may assert Fifth at later proceedings; prior trial cross‑examination was complete; proffered new testimony would be impeachment only | Affirmed — trial court properly denied motion; no authority to strike prior trial testimony and proffered impeachment wouldn’t warrant new trial |
| Exclusion of Alan Carlton’s testimony about statements Kanlica allegedly made (Brady/confrontation claim) | Carlton had exculpatory information showing Kanlica fabricated testimony; State suppressed Brady material; testimony admissible as admission or statement against interest | Carlton’s proffers were hearsay, vague, not party‑opponent admissions, and lacked required corroboration for statements against interest; notices were public record | Affirmed — exclusion proper; hearsay/unreliable, not admissible under party‑opponent or statement‑against‑interest rules; no Brady showing; 911 recording also undercut the proffer |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472 (standards for admissibility of other‑acts evidence under Rule 404(b))
- Frazier v. State, 309 Ga. 219 (OCGA § 24‑4‑403 balancing and prosecutorial need)
- Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65 (limits on purposes for other‑acts evidence)
- Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493 (admissibility when evidence relates to one of charged or predicate offenses)
- Wimberly v. State, 302 Ga. 321 (post‑trial recantation/impeachment generally insufficient for new trial absent impossibility)
- Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281 (use of statements by a defendant against that defendant when offered by the State)
- United States v. Pacchioli, 718 F.3d 1294 (treatment of non‑party statements and party‑opponent rule)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
