Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17696
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- On Nov. 19, 2011, NYPD undercover "buy and bust" operation led to arrests; UC 39 (ghost) reported seeing Kwame Garnett act as a lookout/manager and quoted Garnett as saying words that implied direction of a drug sale.
- Garnett was arrested, held on $50,000 bail, confined for nearly eight months, and acquitted at state trial; no contraband was found on Garnett at arrest.
- Garnett sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, failure to intervene, and denial of the right to a fair trial based on UC 39’s alleged fabrication of his account and forwarding it to prosecutors.
- At the federal trial the jury found for Garnett on the fair-trial claim only, awarding nominal and punitive damages; it found against him on false arrest and malicious prosecution.
- District court denied UC 39’s Rule 50 motion (relying on Ricciuti) and denied Garnett’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial (upholding the district court’s supplemental probable-cause jury instruction).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ricciuti extends to fabricated accounts of an officer’s own observations conveyed to prosecutors | Garnett: Ricciuti covers any officer-fabricated false information forwarded to prosecutors, including false accounts of observations | UC 39: Ricciuti limited to fabricated confessions; probable cause for arrest defeats fair-trial claim; such claims belong to Fourth Amendment false-arrest/malicious-prosecution framework | Court: Ricciuti applies; fabrication of an officer’s account can violate the right to a fair trial even if arrest was supported by probable cause |
| Whether probable cause for arrest negates a fair-trial claim based on fabricated evidence | Garnett: Fabrication can cause additional liberty deprivations (e.g., bail, prosecution) despite probable cause; probable cause not a defense | UC 39: Probable cause makes any post-arrest fabrication legally irrelevant | Court: Probable cause is not a defense; fabrication likely to influence prosecutors/jury can produce a distinct due-process injury recoverable under § 1983 |
| Properness of the district court’s supplemental jury instruction on probable cause in response to a jury note | Garnett: Court should have instructed that mere knowledge of criminal activity without involvement does not establish probable cause | UC 39: Proposed instruction would answer for the jury; court should refer jury back to law as charged | Court: Supplemental instruction (totality-of-circumstances, reasonable-officer standard) was legally correct, covered the issue with existing aiding-and-abetting instructions, and did not abuse discretion |
| Appropriate limiting standard for fair-trial fabrication claims | Garnett: Ricciuti’s elements should govern and permit relief for fabricated officer accounts | UC 39/City: Broad application will chill policing and invite federal retrial of state prosecutions | Court: Adopted Ricciuti’s limiting elements (investigating official; fabricated information; likely to influence jury; forwarded to prosecutors; deprivation of liberty) —sufficiently constrained to address policy concerns |
Key Cases Cited
- Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997) (fabrication by officer forwarded to prosecutors can violate the accused’s right to a fair trial)
- Morse v. Fusto, 804 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Ricciuti and recognizing fabrication-based fair-trial claims)
- Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000) (qualified immunity unavailable where fabrication of evidence caused liberty deprivation)
- Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2003) (articulating elements for fabrication-based fair-trial claims consistent with Ricciuti)
- Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing due-process right not to be framed by fabricated evidence)
- Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992) (constitutional wrongs can implicate more than one constitutional provision)