Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357

Background

Two immigrant petitioners (Cesar Alcaraz-Enriquez and Ming Dai) sought relief from removal; each disputed adverse factual findings by an IJ and the BIA.
Alcaraz-Enriquez had a prior California conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant; a contemporaneous probation report described severe domestic violence, while he later minimized events at his removal hearing.
Dai claimed past/future persecution in China but initially omitted that his wife and daughter had traveled to the U.S. and voluntarily returned to China; when confronted he gave different explanations.
In both cases the IJ denied relief (the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decisions); the Ninth Circuit reversed, applying its rule that an alien’s testimony must be treated as true or credited unless the agency made an explicit adverse credibility finding.
The Supreme Court unanimously vacated and remanded: it held the Ninth Circuit’s deemed-true-or-credible rule conflicts with the INA and administrative-law principles, clarified the limited scope of the statutory credibility presumption, and explained that credibility is not dispositive of persuasiveness or legal sufficiency.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Ninth Circuit’s rule (treat testimony as true absent an explicit adverse credibility finding) is consistent with the INA	Ninth Circuit rule protects applicants when agency does not explicitly reject credibility	Rule conflicts with INA; courts must apply deferential review of agency factfinding	Rejected: rule cannot be reconciled with INA; courts must accept agency findings unless no reasonable adjudicator could reach same result
Whether absence of an explicit adverse credibility finding on BIA appeal entitles petitioners to relief in judicial review	Because there was no explicit adverse finding, petitioners say the statutory presumption of credibility requires relief	Presumption on BIA appeal is rebuttable; BIA may implicitly rebut; courts apply deferential standard	Rejected as applied below; the presumption is rebuttable and the Ninth Circuit failed to consider implicit rebuttal; remand to assess if reasonable adjudicator could have reached agency’s result
Whether a finding that testimony is "credible" alone requires finding the testimony persuasive and legally sufficient to meet burden of proof	Petitioners: credibility should resolve the claim in their favor	Credibility is separate from persuasiveness and sufficiency; agency may find testimony credible but unpersuasive	Held: credibility does not automatically satisfy persuasiveness or burden; agency may credit testimony yet find it insufficient
Proper standard of judicial review of BIA factual findings	Petitioners: treat favorable testimony as true absent explicit adverse finding	Government: apply §1252(b)(4)(B) highly deferential test—accept agency findings unless no reasonable adjudicator could conclude otherwise	Held: courts must apply the deferential §1252(b)(4)(B) standard; Ninth Circuit’s approach inverted that standard

Key Cases Cited

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (courts cannot impose extra procedural requirements on agencies)
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (deferential review of agency findings on asylum facts)
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994) (reviewing courts must accept reasoned agency findings where contrary evidence could support a reasonable factfinder)
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974) (uphold agency decision if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned)
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (review limited to the agency’s stated reasons)
Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Assn., Inc., 390 U.S. 459 (1968) (a factfinder may credit parts of a witness’s testimony without accepting it all)