Garland v. Commonwealth
2015 Ky. LEXIS 11
| Ky. | 2015Background
- John Garland was convicted of three 1997 murders and sentenced to death; convictions affirmed on direct appeal.
- Post-conviction Garland sought DNA testing under KRS 422.285/422.287 of several items, specifically: a clump of hair in victim Jean Ferrier’s left hand, hair from a broken fingernail, and Jean Ferrier’s fingernail clippings.
- On prior appeal the Kentucky Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing limited to testing the two hair specimens (clump and possible nail hair); it did not order testing of the fingernail clippings.
- The two hair samples were DNA-tested on remand and yielded no exculpatory results; the fingernail clippings had been destroyed by Kentucky State Police (KSP) after trial under routine protocol.
- Garland moved for a new trial, arguing KSP destroyed the clippings in bad faith, depriving him of due process; the trial court found no bad faith and denied relief.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding Garland waived his claim about the clippings by failing to pursue them on the earlier appeal and that the trial court’s bad-faith finding was supported by substantial evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Garland waive claim about destroyed fingernail clippings? | Garland argued he retained a right to seek testing and relief after learning clippings were destroyed. | State argued Garland limited his prior appeal to the two hair samples and thus waived other items, including clippings. | Waived: Court held Garland abandoned clippings on prior appeal; claim barred. |
| Did destruction of clippings violate due process? | Garland said clippings potentially contained exculpatory DNA (e.g., son’s DNA) and their destruction impaired defense. | State said items were destroyed pursuant to routine KSP post-trial policy; clippings had no known exculpatory value at time and destruction was not in bad faith. | No due process violation: destruction not shown to be in bad faith. |
| Did Garland prove KSP acted in bad faith? | Garland pointed to missing destruction documentation and an apparent forged destruction form to infer bad faith. | State presented testimony that disposal followed routine policy, officers unaware of a preservation order, and no intent to suppress evidence. | No bad faith: trial court’s finding supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. |
| Were the destroyed clippings potentially exculpatory and irreplaceable? | Garland contended their potential to show third-party (son) involvement made them potentially exculpatory and irreplaceable. | State conceded potential usefulness but stressed lack of known exculpatory value at time of destruction. | Potentially exculpatory and irreplaceable satisfied, but without bad faith relief not warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (U.S. 1984) (government’s destruction of evidence can implicate due process if bad faith and evidence was potentially useful)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (U.S. 1988) (due process requires bad faith destruction of potentially useful evidence)
- McPherson v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2012) (setting Kentucky test for due process when state destroys evidence: bad faith, apparent exculpatory value, and irreplaceability)
- Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988) (distinguishes deliberate destruction to suppress exculpatory material as violating due process)
- Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1997) (addressing discovery/due process issues in evidence-handling contexts)