Gardner v. State, 20 A.3d 801

Gardner was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of armed robbery and handgun use; he was sentenced to 25 years for armed robbery and 5 years for the handgun offense, total 25 years, no parole.
While Petitioner appealed, a three-judge sentence review panel increased the handgun sentence to 20 years, with the panel directing consecutive service, resulting in a 45-year total before any retrial.
Court of Special Appeals remanded for a new trial; at retrial Gardner was again convicted, and the court imposed 25 years for armed robbery and 20 years for the handgun offense, to run consecutively for a 40-year total.
The three-judge panel’s 45-year sentence was not subject to the remand-constrained cap under § 12-702(b); the subsequent retrial sentence could be up to the panel’s figure.
The State and Gardner litigated whether the original sentence or the panel’s sentence is the operative “sentence previously imposed” for the § 12-702(b) cap, given the panel increased the sentence before remand.
The Court holds that the panel’s sentence supplants the original sentence and becomes the operative “sentence previously imposed” for § 12-702(b).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What is the 'sentence previously imposed' after a three-judge panel increases the sentence?	Gardner argues the term is ambiguous and should cap at the original sentence.	State argues the panel’s increased sentence supplants the original and is the operative sentence.	Panel sentence is the 'sentence previously imposed'.
Does the panel’s substitution of a longer sentence defeat Pearce/lenity protections?	Lenity should apply if ambiguity exists, favoring the lesser prior sentence.	No lenity because § 12-702(b) as construed aims to prevent unwarranted increases; panel context lacks vindictiveness.	Pearce/lenity do not alter the result; no due-process issue.
Should lenity be applied given statutory interpretation is possible?	Lenity could resolve any ambiguity.	Lenity not applicable where legislative intent is ascertainable.	Lenity inapplicable; statute is interpreted to give effect to legislative purpose.

State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413 (2010) (statutory interpretation approach: harmonize statute with scheme)
Briggs v. State, 289 Md. 23 (1980) ( Pearce-based purpose of § 12-702(b))
Rendelman v. State, 73 Md.App. 329 (1987) (panel’s sentence is the court’s final sentence when increased)
Collins v. State, 326 Md. 423 (1992) ( origins of sentencing review panel system)
Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364 (1984) ( panel’s sentence passes muster under review)