GARDEI v. CONWAY, 313 Ga. 132

Background

Petitioner Carl Gardei pleaded guilty in Arizona (1992), was released (2003), then registered as a sex offender in New Mexico for ten years and moved to Georgia in 2009, where he registered and has renewed annually.
Gardei alleges Georgia’s Sex Offender Registry (OCGA § 42-1-12 et seq.) is unconstitutional as applied to him and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief (prospective relief only) relieving him from future registration and annual renewal requirements.
Respondents (Gwinnett County Sheriff Conway and then-GBI Director Reynolds) moved to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6), arguing the suit is time-barred by OCGA § 9-3-33 (two-year personal-injury statute).
The trial court dismissed; the Court of Appeals affirmed (divided panel). The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide (1) whether declaratory actions are subject to statutes of limitation, (2) which statute applies, and (3) when accrual occurs given the annual-renewal requirement.
The Supreme Court held: (a) declaratory-judgment actions are generally subject to statutes of limitation; (b) constitutional claims seeking declaratory relief are governed by the two-year personal-injury limitation in OCGA § 9-3-33; and (c) because Gardei seeks only prospective relief, his causes of action have not yet accrued (each annual renewal is a new wrongful act), so the statute has not begun to run — judgment reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are declaratory-judgment actions subject to statutes of limitation?	The Declaratory Judgment Act creates its own remedy and is not governed by a statute of limitation.	The Act is procedural; ordinary limitation statutes apply.	Declaratory actions are subject to applicable statutes of limitation.
Which limitation period applies to constitutional claims for declaratory relief?	(Implicit) No separate longer period; plaintiff sought relief regardless.	The two-year personal-injury rule (OCGA § 9-3-33) applies to constitutional claims like § 1983 analogues.	OCGA § 9-3-33 (two-year personal-injury) applies to federal and state constitutional declaratory claims.
When does the claim accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes given annual registration?	Accrual occurred at initial registration (2009); renewals are mere consequences of that one-time violation.	Accrual occurred at initial registration; thus the claim is time-barred.	Accrual occurs when the injury is complete; each annual renewal is a new wrongful act/injury. Because Gardei seeks only prospective relief, his causes of action have not yet accrued and the statute has not begun to run.
Does the continuing-violation doctrine or tolling save the claim?	Renewal constitutes a continuing violation that tolls the period.	The continuing-violation doctrine does not apply; claim is time-barred.	Court did not decide tolling/continuing-violation issues as unnecessary given its accrual/prospective-relief holding.

Key Cases Cited

Bingham v. Citizens of Southern Nat. Bank, 205 Ga. 285 (1949) (Declaratory-judgment predecessor does not nullify statutes of limitation)
Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166 (1983) (apply limitation period determined by nature of injury, not legal theory)
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (§ 1983 claims characterized as personal-injury actions subject to state limitation periods)
Amu v. Barnes, 283 Ga. 549 (2008) (a personal-injury action does not accrue until the tort is complete)
City of Atlanta v. Kleber, 285 Ga. 413 (2009) (continuing/abatable nuisance discussion on accrual and fresh causes of action)
Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265 (2020) (standard for accepting well-pled facts on motion to dismiss)
Love v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 311 Ga. 682 (2021) (purpose of declaratory relief is to resolve rights before violation occurs)