GARCIA v. VERTICAL SCREEN, INC., 580 F.Supp.3d 79

Background

Plaintiffs are current and former full‑time, non‑exempt researchers/team leaders at Vertical Screen who were paid hourly and via an ADP timekeeping system that only records time after employees clock in.
To begin a shift employees must swipe into the building, boot and log into their workstation, then open and log into ADP to clock in; ADP time does not include time before clock‑in.
Plaintiffs contend frequent login problems (ranging from minutes to 20–30+ minutes in some instances) caused uncompensated pre‑shift work and some employees reported these issues to supervisors/HR.
Plaintiffs also alleged a company practice of supervisors “shaving” 1–2 hours monthly from employees’ timecards; Vertical Screen produced timecard records showing no decreases and denied a systemic practice.
Vertical Screen moved for summary judgment on both claims and argued the FLSA statute of limitations should be two years (not three) because there was no willfulness.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are pre‑shift computer/ADP login activities compensable under the FLSA (Portal‑to‑Portal)?	Login/boot and related troubleshooting are integral and indispensable because employees use computers continuously to perform their work.	Login is preliminary/postliminary and non‑compensable; employer could treat it as commute/security or minimal.	Denied summary judgment; court held login/boot can be compensable (factual question).
Did Plaintiffs present evidence of sufficient uncompensated time (amount and regularity)?	Plaintiff testimony reports frequent, sometimes substantial delays (often >7 minutes).	ADP/Continuum swipe data for some employees shows average clock‑in within minutes; employer asserts typical login is 1–3 minutes.	Denied summary judgment; genuine dispute of material fact as to amount and regularity (goes to jury).
Did Vertical Screen have a policy/practice of supervisors shaving time from timecards?	Plaintiffs assert a company practice reducing recorded hours by 1–2 hours monthly.	Employer produced timecards showing no reductions and most Plaintiffs lacked evidence; allegations are speculative or based on hunches.	Granted summary judgment for defendant; no genuine issue of a systemic time‑shaving practice.
Should the FLSA limitations period be two years or three years (willfulness)?	Willfulness is disputed — employees reported problems and employer had access to records, so recklessness/knowledge is for the jury.	No evidence of willful violation; limit to two‑year statute.	Denied summary judgment on willfulness; factual dispute exists so three‑year willfulness question remains for jury.

Key Cases Cited

Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (activity is compensable if integral and indispensable)
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (pre‑work waiting time not compensable)
Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (donning/doffing protective gear compensable)
Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S. 260 (preparation of tools for production compensable)
Peterson v. Nelnet Diversified Sols., LLC, 15 F.4th 1033 (10th Cir. 2021) (boot/login to computer system used throughout day compensable)
Rutti v. Lojack Corp., 596 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2010) (brief logging on to receive assignments non‑compensable)
Chambers v. Sears Roebuck & Co., [citation="428 F. App'x 400"] (5th Cir. 2011) (logging in for first assignment non‑compensable)
De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361 (de minimis doctrine and factors)
Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057 (de minimis factors analysis)
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (willfulness standard for FLSA statute of limitations)
Stone v. Troy Constr., LLC, 935 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. discussion of willfulness)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden allocation)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (genuine dispute and materiality standard)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (inferences and summary judgment context)