923 F.3d 1242
9th Cir.2019Background
- Garcia pleaded guilty to methamphetamine conspiracy (21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841) and a § 924(c) firearm offense; sentenced in 2008 (later reduced to 195 months).
- He did not directly appeal; filed a § 2255 petition alleging his plea was involuntary, which the district court denied.
- A later habeas filing was treated as successive and denied for lack of authorization; Garcia sought Ninth Circuit authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 petition.
- Garcia based his authorization request on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dean v. United States, arguing Dean announced a new constitutional rule (and that it should be applied retroactively).
- The panel appointed counsel and asked for briefing on whether Dean satisfied 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)’s four requirements for second-or-successive authorization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dean announced a new rule of constitutional law | Dean created a due-process-based right requiring sentencing courts to consider § 924(c) mandatory minimums when imposing a "just" sentence | Dean announced a statutory rule of interpretation, not a constitutional rule | Denied — Dean is statutory, not constitutional; Garcia fails § 2255(h)(2) constitutional-rule requirement |
| Whether Dean’s rule is retroactive to cases on collateral review | Dean’s change to sentencing calculation alters the substantive reach of § 924(c) and should be retroactive | Dean is permissive (allows but does not require consideration) and the Supreme Court has not declared it retroactive; it is not a watershed procedural rule | Denied — Court not made Dean retroactive; Garcia fails § 2255(h)(2) retroactivity requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Bible v. Schriro, 651 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011) (AEDPA second-or-successive framework and high bar for authorization)
- United States v. Lopez, 577 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2009) (procedural context for successive federal habeas applications)
- Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the new-rule must itself be constitutional)
- In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997) (same principle regarding constitutional-rule requirement)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (default rule barring retroactivity of new constitutional procedural rules)
- Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (Supreme Court must make a new rule retroactive to collateral cases)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (new substantive rules apply retroactively)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (example of Court making a rule retroactive)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (substantive rule regarding juvenile LWOP; contrast with Dean)
