Garcia v. Schneider Energy Services, Inc.
287 P.3d 112
Colo.2012Background
- Garcia sued Noble Energy for wrongful death of her husband after a gas well fire; Noble later disclosed a Master Service Contract with Schneider Energy.
- Garcia moved to amend to add Schneider Energy as a defendant; amendment was filed July 28, 2010 and Schneider Energy served mid-October 2010.
- Noble previously answered; Noble dismissed with prejudice after Garcia stipulated to dismissal.
- Schneider Energy moved for summary judgment arguing Garcia failed to name it within the wrongful death statute’s two-year limit and relation back under CRCP 15(c).
- Trial court granted summary judgment, finding that notice to Schneider Energy occurred 71 days after the limitations period ended, thus not reasonable for relation back; Garcia petitioned for review.
- Colorado Supreme Court held that 116 days after the original filing is a reasonable notice period for relation back and remanded for full relation-back analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What constitutes 'within the period provided by law' for relation back? | Garcia: period includes reasonable time for service; notice within that window is allowed. | Schneider Energy: period is the statute of limitations; late notice cannot relate back. | Period includes reasonable time for service; 116 days reasonable. |
| Is 116 days after filing a reasonable notice period for relation back under CRCP 15(c)? | Garcia: 116 days falls within time allowed for service of process and is not prejudicial. | Schneider Energy: delay beyond limitations may be prejudicial and not reasonable. | Yes; 116 days is reasonable for notice under 15(c). |
| Should Colorado follow the federal rule amendments (post-Schiavone) in interpreting 15(c)? | Garcia's position aligns with federal practice and modern liberal pleading goals. | Schneider Energy argues for strict adherence to the plain Colorado language and rule-making process. | Court adheres to 15(c) interpretation consistent with Dillingham, but remands for further analysis; dissent would overrule Dillingham. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dillingham v. Greeley Publishing Co., 701 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1985) (defines 'within the period provided by law' to include reasonable time for service of process)
- Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986) (rejected interpreting 'within the period provided by law' to extend limitations period; led to federal FRCP 15(c) amendment)
- Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.1978) (early federal reading supporting inclusion of time for service after filing)
- Mascitelli v. Giuliano & Sons Coal Co., 157 Colo. 240, 402 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1965) (tolls and timing principles relevant to filing and service)
- Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mut. Irrigation Co., 698 P.2d 1340 (Colo. 1985) (factors for determining reasonable delay in service)
- Nelson v. Blacker, 701 P.2d 135 (Colo. App. 1985) (dismissal for delay in prosecution balancing prejudice and diligence)