563 S.W.3d 333
Tex. App.2018Background
- Plaintiff Joshua Garcia was injured when his car struck a bull that escaped from land owned by defendant Shary Pruski on State Highway 123 in Wilson County.
- Garcia sued for negligence alleging breaches of common-law duties and statutory duties under chapter 143 of the Texas Agriculture Code (including §143.102 and the county "stock law").
- Pruski moved for traditional and no‑evidence summary judgment challenging duty, breach, and proximate cause; the trial court granted the motion and rendered final judgment. Garcia appealed.
- Summary‑judgment evidence included a 2010 county proclamation adopting a stock law, Pruski’s interrogatory answers and deposition (gate latched but not locked, latch broken, no cattle guard), and third‑party deposition testimony about past escapes and gate locking practice.
- The court treated common‑law liability as conceded waived by Garcia on appeal and focused on statutory duties under §143.102 (highway‑specific, requires "knowingly permit") and the stock law provisions in subchapter D (county‑wide prohibition; no "knowingly" element).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Existence of a legal duty under common law | Garcia pleaded common‑law negligence (fence/restraint failure) | Pruski: no common‑law duty to restrain roaming cattle | Court: affirm summary judgment as to common‑law claims (Garcia did not press common‑law duty on appeal) |
| Existence/scope of statutory duty under §143.102 | §143.102 applies; Pruski owed duty not to "knowingly permit" bull on highway right‑of‑way | Pruski conceded duty under §143.102 but argued it is the sole applicable duty | Court: §143.102 applies but requires actual awareness ("knowingly" means actual knowledge), and Garcia’s evidence failed to raise a genuine fact issue on that element; affirm as to §143.102 |
| Application of county "stock law" (subchapter D) | Stock law adopted by Wilson County applies in addition to §143.102; it prohibits permitting cattle to run at large anywhere in county (no "knowingly" requirement) | Pruski: plaintiff failed to prove adoption; alternatively, stock law conflicts with §143.102 so §143.102 controls | Court: proclamation was properly in the record and is prima facie evidence of adoption; no conflict between stock law and §143.102—both can be harmonized; held stock law applies and imposes a separate duty |
| Breach and proximate cause under stock law | Evidence (unlocked latch, prior escape, absence of cattle guard, Pruski’s practices) raises fact issues that Pruski was at fault in permitting the bull to run at large and that this caused injury | Pruski claimed his evidence showed no breach and some opinions were conclusory | Court: evidence created genuine fact issues on breach and proximate cause under the stock law; reverse summary judgment on those claims and remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. 2015) (summary judgment standard reviewed de novo)
- KCM Fin., LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015) (no‑evidence summary judgment standard)
- Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2016) (elements of negligence/proximate cause principles)
- Gibbs v. Jackson, 990 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1999) (Texas common law generally permits cattle to roam at large; statutory exceptions)
- Goode v. Bauer, 109 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied) (treats §143.074 as a statutory duty distinct from §143.102)
- IHS Cedars Treatment Center of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2004) (foreseeability and proximate‑cause principles)
- Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991) (cause‑in‑fact and natural, continuous sequence test)