Garcia v. MEDVED CHEVROLET, INC.
263 P.3d 92
Colo.2011Background
- Plaintiffs filed a class action under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act against Medved dealerships and John Medved.
- They sought two classes: Class I for customers charged for dealer-added products never installed; Class II for customers charged for products installed but not disclosed in writing.
- Plaintiffs alleged Medved’s standard documents and records concealed add-ons and caused injury; absence of Repair/Purchase Orders would imply non-installation.
- Medved argued that a transaction-by-transaction analysis was necessary to prove causation and injury; face-to-face interactions could rebut class-wide inferences.
- The trial court certified both classes based on alleged common proof; the court of appeals remanded for rigorous analysis of individual evidence, and the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The supreme court ultimately affirmed the remand and held that the trial court must analyze individual evidence to determine if class-wide theories of causation and injury are appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can causation be proven on a class-wide basis under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3) | Garcia argues causation can be inferred from Medved's deceptive documents and uniform practices. | Medved contends causation requires individual face-to-face transaction proof. | No; trial court must rigorously analyze whether class-wide causation is supported by evidence and rebuttable by individual evidence. |
| Can injury be proven on a class-wide basis under Hall v. Walter | Plaintiffs claim uniform deception caused injury to all class members. | Medved argues injury may depend on individual transaction details. | Need remand to assess individual transactions to determine class-wide injury theory is valid. |
| Did the trial court err by not considering individualized evidence rebutting class-wide inferences | Plaintiffs rely on common documents; individualized evidence is not necessary. | Defendant submitted face-to-face transaction evidence that could rebut class-wide inferences. | Yes; court must evaluate individualized evidence to determine predominance. |
| Can Garcia serve as representative for Class II | Garcia suffered the same injury as Class II members. | Garcia's injury differs (she alleges non-installation of dealer-added products). | Garcia is not an appropriate representative for Class II. |
Key Cases Cited
- May Department Stores Co. v. Woodard, 863 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1993) (reliance as link to injury in CCPA claims; common proof possible)
- Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998) (establishing injury in fact to a legally protected interest)
- BP America Production Co. v. Patterson, ? (Colo.) (affirmed class-wide inferences may be rebutted by individual evidence)
- Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196 (Colo. 2006) (reliance as first link in chain of causation in legal claims)
- Negrete v. Allianz Life Insurance of North America, 238 F.R.D. 482 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (class certification based on common evidence of reliance)
- In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 522 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2008) (fraud cases often require individual assessments of reliance)
- Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2000) (individual reliance issues may predominate)
- McManus v. Fleetwood Enters., 320 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusal to certify where reliance varies)
- Markarian v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins., 202 F.R.D. 60 (D. Mass. 2001) (no class-wide presumption where information varies by purchaser)
- LaBerenz v. American Family Mut. Ins., 181 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2007) (definitional/administrative feasibility concerns for class definitions)