Garcia v. Does 1-40
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24772
| 2d Cir. | 2014Background
- Plaintiffs, Occupy Wall Street demonstrators, were arrested during a march to the Brooklyn Bridge and its approaches.
- Police directed marchers and blocked traffic; a bottleneck formed at the Bridge entrance with two groups: pedestrian entry and vehicular roadway.
- Officers announced objections to obstructing traffic via bullhorns, but warnings may have been inaudible to most protesters.
- Police eventually moved onto the Bridge roadway, blocked further movement, and arrested over 700 protesters for disorderly conduct.
- Plaintiffs allege officers implied permission or endorsement by retreating and leading the march onto the roadway; defendants assert no explicit authorization occurred.
- District court denied some claims but held the officers lacked qualified immunity; on rehearing, the Second Circuit reversed, granting qualified immunity and dismissing the complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there probable cause for arrest for disorderly conduct? | Plaintiffs claim officers lacked probable cause given ambiguous permission and warning failures. | Officers had knowledge of obstruction and recklessly created risk, establishing probable cause. | Probable cause existed; not clearly established that arrest was unlawful. |
| Is the officers' conduct protected by qualified immunity given the law at the time? | Right not clearly established; officers should know they cannot arrest for such conduct. | Officers acted under arguable probable cause and reasonable interpretation of ambiguous facts. | Qualified immunity applies; the claim is dismissed. |
| Did retreat by officers imply permission to cross the Bridge roadway? | Retreat and leadership of marchers signaled authorization to proceed on the roadway. | Ambiguity of retreat does not unambiguously authorize crossing; no clear permission shown. | Not clearly established that retreat amounted to impermissible permission. |
| Did Cox v. Louisiana require fair warning before arrests in this context? | Cox mandates warning when officials indicate legality despite protest behavior. | Cox is distinguishable and does not clearly apply to the present facts. | Cox does not make the arrest unlawful; no clearly established right shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (U.S. 1965) (demonstrators' rights depend on police interpretation of conduct and warnings)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (clearly established law inquiry in qualified immunity)
- Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (probable cause not require exhaustive innocence inquiry before arrest)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (U.S. 2004) (police may arrest for a different offense than charged if probable cause exists)
- Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2006) (fair warning in protests depends on private property context and interstate factors)
- Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2000) (preexisting law can foreshadow clearly established rights even without circuit precedent)