Garcia-Gines v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 689

Miguel A. Garcia-Gines, a former Army soldier, was discharged for physical disability on May 3, 1995 after an informal Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) recommended separation with severance pay and a 20% disability rating; he waived a formal PEB hearing.
His DD Form 214 records separation as "DISABILITY, SEVERANCE PAY."
He sought correction of his records from the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) several times: an initial untimely request in 2006 was denied (Apr. 5, 2007); a 2010 reconsideration request was rejected as untimely; ABCMR again declined further reconsideration in 2014 (Sept. 25, 2014).
After exhausting administrative options, Garcia-Gines filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims on Dec. 7, 2016 seeking conversion of his separation to permanent disability retirement, an increased disability rating (≥30%), back pay/retirement benefits and money damages.
The government moved to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on statute-of-limitations grounds (28 U.S.C. § 2501), arguing the claim accrued at discharge in 1995 and thus was filed well beyond the six-year limit.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Accrual date for disability-retirement claim under §2501	Claim accrued on final ABCMR action (Sept. 25, 2014), so suit (Dec. 2016) is timely	Claim accrued at discharge (May 3, 1995) because an appropriate board (informal PEB) considered and denied the retirement claim before discharge	Accrual occurred at discharge (May 3, 1995); suit filed in 2016 is time-barred
Effect of waiving a formal PEB hearing on accrual	Waiver does not start limitations; only final corrections-board denial starts accrual	A knowing voluntary waiver of a formal PEB makes the informal PEB decision sufficient to trigger accrual	Waiver of a formal PEB is sufficient; informal PEB decision triggered accrual
Whether court has Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear monetary claims	Garcia-Gines invoked Tucker Act and related statutes	Government did not dispute Tucker Act applicability but invoked §2501 as jurisdictional bar	Tucker Act jurisdiction exists in theory, but §2501’s six-year limit bars this claim as untimely, so court lacks jurisdiction to proceed
Treatment of pro se plaintiff’s pleadings on jurisdictional timeliness	Pro se status and alleged lack of counsel at discharge mitigate timeliness and warrant liberal construction	Pro se status does not relieve plaintiff of burden to prove jurisdiction and timeliness by a preponderance	Pro se liberality considered, but plaintiff still must meet jurisdictional requirements; timeliness deficiency is fatal

Real v. United States, 906 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (disability-retirement claims generally accrue when the first appropriate board finally denies or refuses to hear the claim)
Chambers v. United States, 417 F.3d 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (accrual at discharge applies when claim already was heard and denied before discharge)
Gant v. United States, 417 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (waiver of a formal PEB makes an informal PEB decision sufficient to start the limitations period)
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (§ 2501 six-year statute of limitations is jurisdictional for Court of Federal Claims actions)
Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (a Tucker Act claim accrues when all events have occurred to fix the Government’s liability and permit suit)

Outcome: Defendant's motion to dismiss granted; complaint dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2501.