Ganson Jr. v. City of Marathon
222 So. 3d 17
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2016Background
- In 1970 the Beyers purchased a ~9-acre undeveloped island zoned "General Use" (one single-family home per acre).
- Monroe County adopted a 1986 plan downzoning the property to "Offshore Island" (one unit per ten acres) and created a limited "Beneficial Use Determination" administrative remedy; the Beyers did not challenge at that time.
- A 2010 Comprehensive Plan (adopted by Monroe County in 1996 and incorporated into the City of Marathon upon its 1999 incorporation) reclassified the parcel as a "bird rookery," permitting only "temporary primitive camping" with no land clearing—effectively prohibiting development.
- The Beyers applied for a beneficial-use determination (1997, renewed 2002); after a delayed hearing (2005) the Special Master concluded virtually all economic uses were barred but recommended denial because the Beyers had received 16 ROGO points; the City Council adopted that recommendation.
- The Beyers sued in inverse condemnation alleging an as-applied Lucas-type total regulatory taking (deprivation of all or substantially all economically beneficial use). The trial court granted summary judgment for the City; on appeal this Court in Beyer I and Beyer II affirmed summary judgment against the Beyers largely on statute-of-limitations, laches, and reasonable investment-backed-expectations grounds; rehearing en banc was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Beyer) | Defendant's Argument (City) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2010 Plan as applied effects a Lucas-type per se/total regulatory taking (deprivation of all or substantially all economic use) | The Plan leaves only temporary primitive camping and requires land remain in natural state, depriving all economically beneficial use—Lucas applies | The City's process (beneficial-use review, ROGO points) and factual record do not show a total taking; no compensable taking exists | Court (majority) affirmed summary judgment for City; dissent argues Lucas applies and the economic impact is effectively total, so compensation required |
| Whether the claim is barred as a facial taking by the statute of limitations or is an as-applied taking | Claim is an as-applied Lucas claim (timely) | City/majority treated aspects as time-barred or reframed; reliance on earlier rulings that limited timing | Appellate decisions (Beyer I/II) treated timing to bar or limit certain claims; dissent says Beyers alleged as-applied claim and were timely |
| Whether the Beyers had reasonable investment-backed expectations under Penn Central | Beyers relied on regulatory regime at purchase (General Use zoning permitting development)—objective expectations support claim | City argues expectations diminished by post-acquisition regulatory changes, delay, and lack of objective proof of reliance; court emphasized investment-backed-expectations and delay | Majority concluded no protected reasonable expectations sufficient to defeat summary judgment; dissent says (objectively) expectations at acquisition supported claim and summary judgment improper |
| Whether ROGO points awarded to the Beyers provide constitutionally sufficient compensation or defeat the takings claim | ROGO points are not proven just compensation; valuation is disputed and insufficient for summary judgment | City/Special Master relied on issuance of 16 ROGO points as adequate compensation or mitigation | Court (Beyer II) referenced ROGO points; dissent criticizes reliance on an unproven anecdotal valuation and says ROGO points cannot substitute for just compensation without proper valuation and adjudication |
Key Cases Cited
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (framework for ad hoc regulatory takings inquiry)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (categorical rule for total regulatory takings)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (clarified takings categories; rejected "substantially advances" test)
- Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (post-acquisition notice does not necessarily defeat reasonable investment-backed expectations)
- Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (unconstitutional conditions doctrine in land-use exactions)
- Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (discussed and later explained/abrogated by Lingle regarding the "substantially advances" test)
- Monroe Cty. v. Gonzalez, 593 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (beneficial-use procedure insufficient for just compensation under state law)
- Beyer v. City of Marathon, 37 So.3d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (Beyer I — procedural framing and ripeness/statute-of-limitations issues)
- Beyer v. City of Marathon, 197 So.3d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (Beyer II — affirmed summary judgment; addressed investment-backed expectations and ROGO)