Ganny v. F.J.C. Security Services, Inc., 1:15-cv-01965

Plaintiff Asgarally Ganny, a security guard, sued employer FJC Security Services alleging race and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII and New York Executive Law.
Ganny's amended complaint alleges disparate treatment: punished for a white colleague's misconduct, reassigned a white colleague’s car to him, and assigned to hazardous worksites not given to white colleagues.
FJC moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC.
The Court treats the amended complaint facts as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss and applies the relaxed pleading standard for discrimination claims.
Ganny filed an EEOC intake alleging race and national origin discrimination and named an FJC employee (Laurie Molly) as responsible; the EEOC notice apparently identified the union as the adverse party.
The District Court concluded the EEOC intake provided adequate notice to investigate FJC and that the amended complaint plausibly pleaded a minimal inference of discriminatory intent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the complaint plausibly alleges discrimination under Title VII/NYS law	Ganny alleges disparate treatment vs. similarly situated white colleague and adverse actions supporting inference of discrimination	FJC argues facts are insufficient to show discriminatory intent or that comparator is not similarly situated	Denied dismissal; minimal inference of discriminatory intent is plausible based on alleged disparate treatment
Whether John Khelish is a sufficiently similar comparator	Ganny alleges Khelish was also a security guard, had same supervisors, and his car was reassigned to Ganny	FJC contends Khelish is not similarly situated	Court finds allegations sufficient at pleading stage to infer similarity
Whether Ganny exhausted administrative remedies with the EEOC	Ganny’s EEOC intake alleged race and national origin discrimination and named an FJC employee	FJC contends EEOC charge differed from the complaint and named the union, not FJC, so no exhaustion as to FJC	Denied dismissal; claims are reasonably related to EEOC intake and naming an FJC employee put employer on notice
Whether failure to name employer in EEOC paperwork is fatal	Ganny argues intake named an FJC employee, satisfying notice requirements	FJC argues EEOC notice listed the union, not FJC	Court applies a flexible standard and finds naming of an FJC employee sufficient to identify the employer for exhaustion purposes

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for prima facie discrimination)
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) (relaxed pleading and minimal inference standard at motion to dismiss)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015) (detailed factual allegations not required; use judicial experience)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading plausibility standard)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (Twombly plausibility principle)
Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2003) (disparate treatment via similarly situated comparator)
Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487 (2d Cir. 2009) (comparative evidence supports inference of discrimination)
Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. 2001) (EEOC exhaustion requirement)
Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1991) (flexible stance on Title VII procedural provisions)
Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683 (2d Cir. 2001) (claims reasonably related to those exhausted may be litigated)
Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2008) (what is "reasonably related" for EEOC exhaustion)
Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2003) (district court may consider EEOC filings when evaluating exhaustion on Rule 12(b)(6) motion)
Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006) (EEOC charge must give agency adequate notice to investigate)