476 F.Supp.3d 580
E.D. Ky.2020Background:
- Late-night incident (June 29, 2016): Jessie Mills, apparently impaired, took his two‑year‑old daughter from her custodial grandparents and walked in the middle of a dark two‑lane road.
- Knox County Deputy Mikey Ashurst and Constable Brandon Bolton responded to a kidnapping call and encountered Mills still holding the child.
- Officers used nonlethal force (Taser, strikes with flashlight/ASP, physical control) to separate the child and to attempt arrest; a physical struggle ensued and officers lost control of some equipment.
- Mills repeatedly failed to comply, resisted on the ground (witnesses report kicking/struggling), rose despite commands, and advanced toward Ashurst; Ashurst fired fatal shots.
- Plaintiff (personal representative) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force), state torts (assault, battery, wrongful death), and Monell failure‑to‑train/supervise; defendants moved for summary judgment.
- Court granted summary judgment for defendants on federal claims (excessive force and Monell), found officers entitled to qualified immunity, and dismissed state claims without prejudice (declining supplemental jurisdiction).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| §1983 excessive force | Ashurst/Bolton used excessive, gratuitous force and Mills posed no immediate threat when shot | Use of force was reasonable given kidnapping offense, Mills’ erratic/drug‑impaired behavior, active resistance, and an advancing suspect | Court: No genuine dispute — force (including deadly force) was objectively reasonable under the totality of circumstances; federal claim dismissed |
| Qualified immunity (officers) | Right not to be shot was clearly established; factual disputes preclude immunity | Officers reasonably believed deadly force necessary; no controlling case with materially similar facts put conduct beyond debate | Court: Officers entitled to qualified immunity because their use of force was objectively reasonable; even if not, plaintiff cited no closely analogous precedent |
| Monell municipal liability (failure to train/supervise) | Knox County deliberately indifferent in training/supervising Ashurst and allowing untrained constable Bolton to operate with deputies | No underlying constitutional violation; Ashurst had state academy certification; constables are statutorily exempt from required certification; plaintiff shows no pattern or deliberate indifference | Court: No §1983 municipal liability (no officer violation); alternate Monell theories fail on the merits—summary judgment for county |
| State‑law claims / supplemental jurisdiction | Plaintiff urged adjudication in federal court | Defendants argued dismissal of federal claims warrants remand/dismissal of state claims | Court: Declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed state claims without prejudice (comity, judicial economy, statutory tolling considered) |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly‑force seizure is governed by Fourth Amendment; deadly force permissible if officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses serious threat)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use‑of‑force claims judged by "objective reasonableness" under totality of circumstances)
- Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2009) (segmented analysis; evaluate officer’s split‑second judgments immediately before force)
- Yates v. Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1991) (denial of qualified immunity where officer’s pre‑shooting conduct was not objectively reasonable)
- Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2008) (identifies relevant Graham factors, including severity of crime and imminence of threat)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑step framework)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (clearly established law cannot be defined at high level of generality)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burden shifting rules)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine dispute of material fact on summary judgment)
- Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2006) (totality of circumstances governs reasonableness inquiry)