Galvan, Julio Francisco
PD-1179-15
| Tex. | Dec 1, 2015Background
- Julio Francisco Galvan was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child (victim B.L., age 12) and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The First Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion.
- At trial, the complainant testified that Galvan digitally penetrated her while she slept during an overnight stay at Galvan's house; defense denied penetration and presented witnesses supporting Galvan's account that he did not enter the bedroom.
- Two prospective jurors (nos. 45 and 48) stated during voir dire that they "could not be fair" for this type of case; defense counsel did not challenge them and both served on the jury.
- The trial court initially ruled that an alleged extraneous act (a statement in the victim’s medical record that Galvan had touched his daughter similarly when she was 13) was more prejudicial than probative, but the medical records containing that statement were later admitted over defense counsel’s limited objections.
- Galvan raised numerous ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on appeal, principally (1) failure to strike actually biased jurors and (2) failure to properly object to/exclude the hearsay extraneous-offense statement in the medical records.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Galvan) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether counsel was ineffective for allowing two jurors who voiced actual bias to serve | Counsel failed to understand law prohibiting actually biased jurors and thus unreasonably declined to challenge them; Nelson controls and supports finding deficiency | Waiver/forfeiture principles apply; defendant can waive impartial-jury challenges through counsel as a tactical decision (Delrio and CCA precedent); silent record presumes reasonable strategy | Court of Appeals: no ineffective assistance — presumption of reasonable strategy stands and record silent about counsel’s reasons; conviction affirmed |
| 2) Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to and exclude extraneous-offense hearsay in medical records | Trial court had found the extraneous-act prejudicial; counsel’s failure to object to the medical-records statement was deficient and prejudiced outcome given lack of corroboration and centrality of complainant’s credibility | Even if inadmissible, appellant did not show reasonable probability of a different outcome; absence of detailed Rule 403 analysis and no showing of Strickland prejudice | Court of Appeals: no ineffective assistance — even assuming error, Galvan failed to show Strickland prejudice; conviction affirmed |
| 3) Failure to test complainant’s competency to testify | Complainant saw neurologist and took medication; counsel should have tested competency | Complainant could observe, recollect, narrate and distinguish truth from lie; no basis to show counsel deficient | Court of Appeals: no deficiency; competency satisfied |
| 4) Other trial errors (investigation, expert voir dire, impeachment, punishment-phase mitigation) | Counsel failed to obtain prior statements, voir dire experts, present mitigating witnesses, preserve variance error, etc. | Record is silent or does not show what mitigation/evidence existed; many decisions could be reasonable strategic choices | Court of Appeals: Galvan did not meet burden to overcome presumption of reasonable assistance for these claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (explains waiver/forfeiture of impartial-jury challenge and presumption that counsel’s jury-selection decisions may be strategic)
- Nelson v. State, 832 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992) (cited by Galvan for proposition that counsel’s failure to challenge actually biased jurors can be per se unreasonable)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Doles v. State, 786 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App. 1989) (extraneous-offense evidence and prejudice analysis relied on by Galvan)
- Ex parte Martin, 6 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (procedural point regarding scope of appellate review when court of appeals bases decision on one prong)