Gallop v. Cheney, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13886

Gallop petitioned for rehearing on June 13, 2011 after this Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of her 9/11-related claim as frivolous.
This Court previously held Gallop’s complaint alleged conspiratorial acts by former officials to facilitate policy goals and misallocate funds, deeming it frivolous.
We ordered Gallop and counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for filing a frivolous appeal.
Gallop moved to disqualify the panel under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a) claiming bias from the panel’s 9/11-related ruling.
The panel denied disqualification and denied Gallop’s petition for panel rehearing; rehearing in banc would proceed in due course.
William Veale, Gallop’s counsel, was ordered to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for his conduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the panel should be disqualified for bias	Gallop alleges evident bias due to emotions about 9/11.	Rulings alone do not establish bias warranting disqualification.	Disqualification denied.
Whether the panel rehearing should be granted	Gallop seeks rehearing on the panel's prior adverse ruling.	No basis to overturn the prior decision; in banc reconsideration pending.	Panel rehearing denied; in banc to be considered in normal course.
Whether sanctions against Gallop's counsel are appropriate	Frivolous filing justification for sanctions against counsel.	No specific assertion of misconduct beyond the appeal; sanctions may be appropriate if warranted.	Sanctions potential; Veale ordered to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.
Scope of sanctions authority and notice requirements	Rule 38, §1927, and inherent power authorize sanctions for misconduct.	Sanctions must follow proper procedural authority and notice.	Veale ordered to show cause within 30 days; notice requirements specified.

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (prior rulings generally not basis for disqualification)
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (Supreme Court 1994) (judicial rulings rarely justify recusal absent deep-seated antagonism)
In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950 (2d Cir. 2008) (rulings against a party insufficient for disqualification)
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (Supreme Court 1921) (extreme bias evidenced by public statements)
In re Nettles, 394 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2005) (recusal in response to permissible threats; not directly on point)
Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1999) (rule of necessity cautions against broad recusal)
In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2000) (sanctions considerations in appellate context)