14 F. Supp. 3d 1380
S.D. Cal.2014Background
- Plaintiff Gallagher challenges the District's denial of an A-9 Anchorage permit, alleging ADA retaliation.
- Ninth Circuit remanded after reversing summary judgment for the District on Gallagher's ADA retaliation claim; mandate directed further proceedings.
- District invokes Supreme Court's Nassar decision (but-for causation) as intervening law to change the causation standard before trial.
- Court analyzes whether Nassar applies to ADA retaliation claims and if its but-for standard governs this case.
- Court addresses whether the District waived reliance on Nassar and how the law-of-the-case and mandate doctrines apply on remand.
- Court schedules supplemental briefing to determine if Gallagher can establish but-for causation under ADA retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nassar applies to ADA retaliation claims | Gallagher argues Nassar's but-for standard should not control ADA retaliation. | District contends ADA retaliation follows but-for causation per Nassar. | Nassar applies to ADA retaliation; but-for standard governs. |
| Whether Nassar is an intervening law that allows departing from the Ninth Circuit mandate | Nassar cannot be treated as intervening law since decided before mandate. | Nassar constitutes intervening law permitting departure from mandate. | Nassar is intervening law warranting departure from the mandate. |
| Whether the District waived reliance on Nassar by not raising it earlier | District failed to raise Nassar before the Ninth Circuit, implying waiver. | Rule 28(j) allows supplemental authorities; waiver is not mandatory. | Non-waiver; reliance on Nassar is permitted on remand. |
| What is the controlling causation standard for Gallagher's ADA retaliation claim upon remand | Plaintiff must show but-for causation under ADA retaliation. | District argues for but-for causation under ADA retaliation as per Nassar. | But-for causation governs ADA retaliation; remand to apply this standard. |
Key Cases Cited
- University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (U.S. 2013) (but-for causation governs Title VII retaliation claims; applied to ADA retaliation per court)
- Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (Title VII retaliation framework applied to ADA retaliation claims)
- Hegler v. Borg, 990 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1993) (intervening Supreme Court authority may justify departing from mandate on remand)
- Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2004) (intervening authority can provide important guidance to reconsider on remand)