Gall v. Steele, 547 S.W.3d 564

Background

Decker (circuit clerk) entered a 2008 consolidation agreement naming the circuit clerk as appointing authority for deputy and division clerks.
In 2009 the Missouri Supreme Court issued an administrative order directing consolidation of court personnel and setting procedures for designating an appointing authority; it grandfathered preexisting plans like the 2008 agreement.
In 2013 the Supreme Court amended the 2009 order to permit en banc circuit courts, after consultation, to submit revisions to the CCBC for approval.
The Second Judicial Circuit en banc transferred Decker’s appointing authority first to Judge Steele (May 2013) and later to Judge Swaim (April 2014); Plaintiffs sued challenging the amendments.
Plaintiffs’ summary judgment framed issues as whether the circuit court could designate someone other than the elected clerk (separation-of-powers/statutory claim) and, if valid, whether Steele complied with the 2009 order’s procedures; Plaintiffs expressly disclaimed challenging the validity of the 2009 Supreme Court order itself.
The circuit court granted judgment to Plaintiffs; the appellate process raised whether Plaintiffs waived constitutional challenges to the Supreme Court’s 2009/2013 orders and whether those orders validly delegated supervisory authority to permit the transfers.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the circuit court could designate an appointing authority other than the elected circuit clerk (separation of powers/statutory claim)	Such a transfer violates the Missouri Constitution and §483.245 because only the elected clerk may hold appointing authority	Transfers were authorized under the Supreme Court’s 2009/2013 orders and Second Circuit en banc actions; consistent with supervisory authority	Court reversed circuit court judgment and entered for Judges Steele and Swaim; the transfers were within delegated supervisory authority (as explained by Draper, J.)
Whether Plaintiffs waived challenge to the 2009 Supreme Court order	Plaintiffs contended implementation by Second Circuit was improper but did not challenge the 2009 order itself	Defendants argued Plaintiffs waived any attack on the 2009 order and that original jurisdiction belonged to the Supreme Court to challenge such orders	Held Plaintiffs waived any constitutional challenge to the 2009/2013 orders by their pleadings and summary-judgment positions; court need not resolve validity of those orders
Whether Judge Steele complied with the procedures required by the 2009 order when effectuating the May 2013 amendment	Plaintiffs argued Steele failed to follow required procedure, rendering the transfer invalid	Steele argued he followed the 2009/2013 order procedures or that subsequent en banc/CCBC actions validated changes	Circuit court had analyzed procedural compliance; appellate decision resolved in favor of Judges Steele and Swaim (procedural compliance not fatal to transfers)
Whether this Court has constitutional authority to issue/modify consolidation orders delegating appointing authority	Plaintiffs implicitly argued such orders raise separation-of-powers concerns	Defendants relied on art. V, §4 supervisory authority and the Court’s administrative powers to consolidate court personnel	Draper, J. concluded the 2009/2013 orders were a valid exercise of the Court’s supervisory authority and supported the Second Circuit’s amendments; but Plaintiffs’ challenge was waived so Court did not fully decide all questions

Key Cases Cited

Pestka v. State, 493 S.W.3d 405 (Mo. banc 2016) (every word of a constitutional provision must be given effect)
State v. Pierce, 433 S.W.3d 424 (Mo. banc 2014) (issues not raised below are waived on appeal)
Heinen v. Healthline Mgmt., Inc., 982 S.W.2d 244 (Mo. banc 1998) (distinguishing supervisory authority for court administration)
State ex rel. Barker v. Wurdeman, 163 S.W. 849 (Mo. 1914) (superintending control historically exercised via writs)
Walker v. Owen, 79 Mo. 563 (Mo. 1883) (party must stand or fall by the theory presented in the trial court)