F082404A
Cal. Ct. App.Feb 24, 2023Background:
- Galarsa electronically signed Dollar General’s employee arbitration agreement (March 2016) that included a broad arbitration requirement, a class/representative-action waiver, and a severability clause.
- She sued under PAGA for multiple Labor Code violations she allegedly suffered and for violations allegedly suffered by other employees; she gave the required notice to the LWDA and filed in state court.
- Dollar General moved to compel arbitration; the trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal initially affirmed; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded in light of Viking River Cruises v. Moriana.
- On remand, the Court of Appeal held California’s Iskanian rule (PAGA representative waivers unenforceable) remains valid and that the arbitration agreement’s severability clause permits striking the invalid waiver.
- The court construed the remaining agreement as covering only PAGA claims seeking penalties for violations suffered by Galarsa (Type A) and requiring arbitration of those claims.
- The court held PAGA claims seeking penalties for violations suffered by other employees (Type O) may proceed in court; the order was reversed in part (Type A) and affirmed in part (Type O) and remanded to compel arbitration of Type A claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of PAGA representative-action waiver | Waiver is invalid under California public policy (Iskanian) and cannot be enforced. | FAA preempts state-law rules limiting arbitration, so the waiver (and division of PAGA claims) should be enforced. | Iskanian’s anti-waiver rule remains valid under California law; the waiver is unenforceable as to PAGA representative claims. |
| Effect of severability clause | Severability preserves the arbitration agreement after striking unlawful waiver. | Same; enforce the remainder to the extent lawful. | Severability permits striking the invalid waiver and enforcing the remaining arbitration provisions. |
| Scope of arbitration (Type A v. Type O claims) | PAGA claims based on Galarsa’s own violations (Type A) are arbitrable; representative claims for other employees (Type O) are distinct and not covered by her employment-based arbitration consent. | Arbitration agreement covers all employment-related claims, so all PAGA claims should be arbitrated or dismissed. | The agreement covers and must send Type A claims to arbitration; it does not cover Type O claims because those arise from other employees’ rights. |
| Standing and splitting: whether Type O claims must be dismissed after Type A arbitration | Galarsa remains an "aggrieved employee" with standing to pursue Type O claims in court; California’s anti-splitting rule does not bar pursuing Type O claims separately. | Following Viking River, Type O claims lose standing and should be dismissed once Type A claims are compelled to arbitration. | Plaintiff retains PAGA standing for Type O claims; the court predicts (and holds here) that California law allows Type O claims to proceed in court after Type A arbitration. |
Key Cases Cited
- Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S. Ct. 1906 (U.S. 2022) (FAA preempts rule preventing division of PAGA into individual and non-individual claims)
- Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (Cal. 2014) (predispute waivers of representative PAGA actions violate public policy)
- Kim v. Reins International California, Inc., 9 Cal.5th 73 (Cal. 2020) (PAGA standing requires aggrieved-employee status; discussion of splitting PAGA claims)
- Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.4th 969 (Cal. 2009) (PAGA deputizes employees to enforce state labor laws)
- ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.5th 175 (Cal. 2019) (all PAGA actions are "representative" in the sense they are brought on the state's behalf)
- Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666 (Cal. 1994) (California rule against splitting causes of action and primary-right theory)
- Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC, 55 Cal.4th 223 (Cal. 2012) (arbitration is a matter of consent; contractual scope principles)
