Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District
2012 IL 110012
| Ill. | 2012Background
- Gaffney and Lemmenes, Illinois firefighters, were injured in line-of-duty incidents while participating in training exercises and sought continuing health coverage benefits under 820 ILCS 320/10.
- Gaffney’s injury occurred during a live-fire drill when a hose entangled with a loveseat, injuring his shoulder; he claimed the injury occurred while responding to what he reasonably believed was an emergency.
- The board denied benefits, issuing a written Decision and Order, which Gaffney challenged in two counts: declaratory judgment and administrative review; the trial court treated the latter as a writ of certiorari.
- The Fire Protection District Act did not expressly authorize administrative review of eligibility determinations under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act; the district argued the board’s decision was a final administrative action subject to review.
- The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s view that the board’s denial was an administrative decision; the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding the declaratory judgment path was proper and the statute’s scope did not authorize a traditional administrative review.
- Lemmenes’ case involved a drill simulating a supermarket fire where he injured his knee; the trial court found he reasonably believed he was responding to an emergency, but the appellate court relied on DeRose to deem the situation an emergency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gaffney’s declaratory judgment claim was proper | Gaffney: declaratory judgment appropriate to determine entitlement under the Act | Board: review only via administrative channels; declaratory judgment improperly bypasses that route | Declaratory judgment proper; remand on Gaffney’s claim |
| Whether the board’s denial of section 10 benefits is subject to administrative review | Gaffney contends the board’s decision is not an administrative action and not restricted to administrative review | District maintains the decision is an administrative action reviewable under Administrative Review Law | Board’s decision is not an administrative action subject to ARL; declaratory judgment appropriate |
| Whether section 10(b) emergency requires an unforeseen circumstance | Gaffney argues ‘emergency’ can include training evolutions and unforeseen events during training | District argues emergency must be a real, unforeseen crisis; training scenarios are not emergencies | Emergency includes unforeseen circumstances involving imminent danger; training turning into emergency can qualify |
Key Cases Cited
- DeRose v. City of Highland Park, 386 Ill. App. 3d 658 (2008) (emergency defined as urgent, requiring immediate action)
- Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392 (2003) (catastrophic injury linked to line-of-duty status; interpretation of ‘catastrophic’)
- Holly v. Montes, 231 Ill. 2d 153 (2008) (statutory interpretation must reflect plain meaning; avoid adding exceptions)
- Manos v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 202 Ill. 2d 563 (2002) (case cited for statutory interpretation principles)
- People ex rel. Department of Professional Regulation v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563 (2002) (statutory interpretation principles caution against extrinsic aids)
- Davison v. People, 233 Ill. 2d 30 (2009) (undefined terms interpreted using dictionary to ascertain ordinary meaning)
