Gabriel G. Williams v. State of Indiana
2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 414
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- At ~3:00 a.m. on Oct. 9, 2014, Gabriel Williams and a passenger were in a parked Camaro behind a residence on North Walnut Street in South Bend when a ShotSpotter alert sent police to the area.
- Officers found Williams in the driver’s seat; he initially refused commands and was detained. A Smith & Wesson .380 handgun was recovered from under the driver’s seat, loaded with one round; marijuana was found in the console.
- A fired bullet had entered and exited the vinyl siding of one house, ricocheted, and lodged in the siding of the second-story of a house across the street where a child was sleeping; the bullet was recovered from the siding.
- Williams first told officers an acquaintance (“T”) fired at a raccoon; later, after arrest, Williams admitted the gun was his and that he shot at a raccoon; he did not mention “T” during the later interview.
- The State charged Williams with, among other counts, Level 5 felony criminal recklessness (shooting a firearm into an inhabited dwelling). The jury convicted him of criminal recklessness and unlawful carrying of a handgun; the trial court entered judgment and sentenced Williams to an aggregate five-year term (three years probation).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence suffices to convict Williams of Level 5 criminal recklessness for shooting a firearm into an inhabited dwelling | State: shot into an inhabited dwelling because the bullet entered/ passed through siding and lodged in another house’s siding where occupants (including a child) were present | Williams: “into” requires entry into the living area; merely striking/ lodging in exterior siding does not satisfy the statute | Affirmed: court holds a bullet that penetrates a dwelling’s boundary (siding) is “into” the dwelling for the statute; jury verdict sustained |
Key Cases Cited
- Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809 (Ind. 2016) (standard of review for statutory interpretation and sufficiency review)
- Humes v. State, 426 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. 1981) (recklessness is a general intent crime; specific intent to harm not required)
- Beeman v. State, 115 N.E.2d 919 (Ind. 1953) (discussing willfulness and reckless disregard for safety)
- Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. 2010) (statutory interpretation: give plain and ordinary meaning to terms)
- Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190 (Ind. 2016) (if statute unambiguous, apply its plain meaning)
- State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. 2004) (same: apply statute’s clear and plain meaning)