G. Steven Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc.
128 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 155
| Mo. | 2015Background
- Steven Cox (age 61) was a long‑time Kansas City Chiefs maintenance manager terminated October 14, 2010 and replaced by a younger worker; Cox alleged age discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) as a single‑act claim for his termination.
- Cox’s theory: Chiefs leadership (notably Clark Hunt, Mark Donovan, Scott Pioli) pursued a company‑wide push to “go in a more youthful direction,” resulting in multiple employees over 40 being fired or forced out and replaced by younger workers in a short time frame.
- Before and at trial Cox sought to present testimony from roughly 17 former employees (and others) — their ages, circumstances of separation, and ages of replacements — as circumstantial "me too" evidence of discriminatory intent; the trial court excluded testimony about their ages, firings/resignations, and pending suits in a blanket ruling.
- The trial court also excluded testimony of Herman Suhr recounting an overheard Pioli remark about needing to remove employees over 40, ruling it a stray remark by a nondecisionmaker; the court quashed deposition/subpoena of CEO Clark Hunt.
- Jury returned verdict for the Chiefs; Missouri Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding the trial court abused its discretion by applying an overly strict “similarly situated” test and by blanket excluding "me too" evidence, the Pioli remark, and barring limited discovery of Hunt.
Issues
| Issue | Cox's Argument | Chiefs' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of "me too" evidence (other employees’ ages, separations, replacements) | Such evidence is relevant circumstantial proof of a company‑wide discriminatory intent affecting Cox’s single‑act claim; admissibility depends on fact‑specific factors, not a rigid similarity test | Excluded because Cox did not plead a pattern‑or‑practice claim and witnesses were not "similarly situated" to Cox (different supervisors, departments, or circumstances) | Reversed: blanket exclusion was abuse of discretion; courts must apply a fact‑based, case‑by‑case inquiry (Sprint), weighing probative value vs prejudice for each witness rather than a per se similarity rule |
| Admissibility of Pioli remark (Suhr’s hearsay of overheard comment) | Admissible as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent and as party admission/impeachment; relevant given Cox’s theory of top‑down policy | Inadmissible as a stray remark by a nondecisionmaker and unreliable (distance/wall) | Reversed: remark was admissible circumstantial evidence (nondecisionmaker remarks not per se inadmissible); credibility is for the jury |
| Quashing deposition/subpoena of CEO Clark Hunt | Hunt’s testimony is relevant to Cox’s theory that a company‑wide policy originated with Hunt; limited deposition is appropriate | Depositions of top‑level executives are disfavored and unduly burdensome where lower‑level witnesses can supply the same info | Reversed in part: trial court abused discretion by quashing deposition entirely; top executives with discoverable information may be deposed when relevant and necessary |
| Standard of review for evidentiary exclusions | Trial court must consider logical relevance and legal relevance (probative value v. prejudice) and not apply disparate‑treatment "similarly situated" standard mechanically | Trial court’s broad exclusion and concern about confusing the jury and prejudice was within discretion, especially given Cox didn’t exhaust pattern claims administratively | Court: abuse of discretion where the trial court issued a blanket ruling without individualized balancing; admissibility should follow Sprint’s multifactor, fact‑based approach |
Key Cases Cited
- Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (U.S. 2008) (me‑too evidence relevance is fact‑based; no per se exclusion when non‑unit supervisors involved)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (framework for analyzing circumstantial discrimination claims)
- Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. banc 2007) (Missouri courts look to federal discrimination jurisprudence; circumstantial evidence common)
- Williams v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (distinguishes disparate‑treatment "similarly situated" analysis from admissibility of "me‑too" evidence)
- Bynote v. National Super Markets, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. banc 1995) (admissions by agent/employee may bind principal when within scope of authority)
- Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting exclusion of me‑too evidence solely for lack of common decisionmaker; courts must weigh multiple factors)