G. Lance Salladay v. Eric Bowen, 388 P.3d 577

Background

Property at 615 E. Chicago St., Caldwell was subject to a recorded Memorandum of Sale signed by Salladay (as personal representative of Roger Troutner’s estate) but not signed by purchaser Stroud; the memorandum used an improper acknowledgment and was therefore not properly recorded.
Caldwell Irrigation Lateral District (CILD) issued a tax deed for the property on July 14, 2014, and mailed written notice only to Stroud; notice was also given by newspaper publication. Stroud was neither the record owner nor a properly recorded party in interest.
On December 16, 2014 CILD sold the property to Eric Bowen; the Bowens recorded the tax deed December 19, 2014.
Salladay (as personal representative) filed in district court to reverse the deed and clear title, arguing he was entitled to notice and none was provided. The district court held Salladay was entitled to notice and remanded to CILD for a hearing; Bowens appealed.
The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed whether the Memorandum was properly recorded, whether statutory notice requirements (Idaho Code § 43-717) were met, whether notice to Stroud could be imputed to Salladay, and whether remand was an appropriate remedy.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Salladay)	Defendant's Argument (Bowen)	Held
Was the Memorandum properly recorded?	The Memorandum substantially complied and was recordable.	It was not properly recorded as purchaser did not sign and acknowledgment form was unnecessary.	The memorandum used an oath endorsement, not the required representative acknowledgment (I.C. §55-713); it was not properly recorded.
Did CILD provide required written notice before issuing a tax deed?	No; Salladay (estate PR) received no written notice, so deed issuance violated statutory and due process requirements.	CILD served Stroud and published notice; that was sufficient.	Notice to Stroud alone was insufficient because Stroud was neither record owner nor properly recorded party in interest; lack of proper notice rendered the tax deed void ab initio.
Can actual notice to Stroud be imputed to Salladay under I.C. §43-717(6)?	N/A (argument would undermine claim of lack of notice).	Yes: actual notice to one party is sufficient and should be imputed.	No; statute requires serving record owner(s) and parties in interest; imputing notice would conflict with statute and due process.
Was Salladay’s petition to district court untimely under I.C. §43-719(4)?	Petition timely because no final board decision ever issued (no proper notice/hearing).	Petition untimely; should have been filed within 30 days of final decision.	Timing provision applies only after a final decision that presupposes proper notice/hearing; it did not apply here, so petition was not untimely.

Key Cases Cited

In re Jerome Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 153 Idaho 298, 281 P.3d 1076 (free review of statutory violations by boards)
Sines v. Blaser, 100 Idaho 50, 592 P.2d 1367 (mandatory notice for tax deeds; lack of notice is fatal)
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (due process requires notice and hearing before depriving property)
Dufur v. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 128 Idaho 319, 912 P.2d 687 (tax deed void for failure to satisfy due process/notice)
Jordan v. Sec. Credit Corp., 79 Idaho 284, 314 P.2d 967 (incorrect acknowledgment form can render instrument void)
Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 585 P.2d 954 (void deed conveys no legal title)