G.I. SPORTZ INC. v. VALKEN INC.
1:17-cv-05590
D.N.J.Jul 1, 2019Background
- Plaintiffs G.I. Sportz Inc. and G.I. Sportz Direct LLC own two patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,644,295 and 6,901,923) claiming pneumatic assemblies for paintball guns.
- Plaintiffs allege Valken, Inc. makes and sells accused pneumatic assemblies (notably the V12 Valken Airsoft Engine) that infringe those patents.
- Valken disputes infringement, arguing its accused devices operate by springs (not pneumatic pressure) and do not satisfy claimed "chamber" and "housing" configurations; also contends its products are airsoft (pellets), not paintball devices.
- The parties disputed construction of 14 claim terms (out of 21 at issue); they agreed on seven others. The Court held a Markman hearing and issued constructions.
- The Court applied the Federal Circuit’s claim‑construction approach (context of claims/specification, possible disclaimer, and alignment with patent description) and construed terms including: "paintball gun," various forms of "housing," "disposed/chamber," surface‑area terms, and phrases about receiving/overcoming compressed gas.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether preamble term "paintball gun" requires construction | "Paintball gun" is merely a non‑limiting use/purpose in the preamble and needs no construction | Term should be construed before deciding if it is a limitation; defendant proposes "air cannon for deploying paintballs" | Court construed "paintball gun" as "a device for deploying a paintball" and treated it as needing construction for claim context |
| Meaning of "housing" and related phrases ("substantially contiguous assembly housing," "gas storage area housing") | "Housing" has ordinary meaning; no special construction needed; plaintiffs oppose added limitations | Defendant urges more specific constructions to distinguish variants | Court defined "housing" as "a body containing [certain components]"; "gas storage area housing" = "a body containing the gas storage area"; "substantially contiguous assembly housing" = "a body containing components that are connected together in-line" |
| "Disposed" / "chamber" / "a single longitudinally disposed chamber" / "configured to be disposed in a closed position" | Plaintiffs favor plain meaning or "arranged" and view "chamber" as a longitudinal area based on specification | Defendant favors "located" for "disposed," and a volumetric/container‑focused "chamber"; urges in‑line/series language for the single longitudinal chamber | Court held "disposed" = "arranged"; "chamber" = "compartment"; "configured to be disposed in a closed position" = "arranged in a closed position"; "a single longitudinally disposed chamber" = "one longitudinally arranged compartment" |
| "First surface area" / "Second surface area" and related gas‑flow phrases (e.g., "overcoming a force created by the compressed gas on the first surface area", "configured to continuously receive", "configured to selectively receive") | Plaintiffs: plain and ordinary meaning; terms and their functions are already set forth in claims/specification | Defendant: proposes constructions that embed functional descriptions (e.g., constant supply holding valve closed; selective supply actuates valve) | Court adopted plain and ordinary meaning for these terms and declined to import additional functional limitations; specifically applied plain meaning to "first/second surface area," "overcoming a force...", and the "configured to..." phrases |
Key Cases Cited
- Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (claim construction is a question of law for the court)
- Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (subsidiary factual findings in claim construction can be reviewed under clear‑error)
- In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litigation, 778 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (familiar Federal Circuit approach to claim construction)
- O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (plain‑meaning determination can be inadequate when multiple ordinary meanings exist or ambiguity remains)
- ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (specification and prosecution history inform claim meaning; functions of invention relevant)
- Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (look to ordinary meaning in context of written description and prosecution history)