603 F.Supp.3d 626
N.D. Ill.2022Background
- In 2016 G.G., a 13-year-old, was trafficked and advertised for sex on Backpage; Backpage later pleaded guilty and admitted it benefited from sex trafficking.
- Backpage contracted with Salesforce in 2013 for CRM SaaS and support (including Enterprise Edition and technical assistance), which Plaintiffs allege enabled Backpage’s expansion and marketing to traffickers.
- Plaintiffs (G.G. and her mother) sued Salesforce under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, alleging Salesforce knowingly benefited from and participated in a venture that engaged in sex trafficking.
- Salesforce moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing (1) § 230 CDA immunity bars the claims and (2) Plaintiffs failed to plead the elements of a § 1595 beneficiary claim.
- The court held that Salesforce is an “interactive computer service,” § 230 applies because the claims treat Salesforce as the publisher of third‑party content, and the FOSTA carve‑out (§ 230(e)(5)(A)) does not apply because Plaintiffs did not allege Salesforce itself violated § 1591.
- The court alternatively found Plaintiffs failed to plead § 1595 elements (no plausible allegation that Salesforce knowingly benefited from participation in a venture that it knew or should have known violated § 1591 as to G.G.); judgment for Salesforce, dismissal with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Salesforce an “interactive computer service” under § 230? | Salesforce’s CRM is merely internal relationship-management; not the kind of public host covered by § 230. | Salesforce is a software provider/enabling tool that allows multiple users to access server tools to analyze, organize, transmit content—falls within § 230(f)(2)/(4). | Held: Salesforce qualifies as an interactive computer service as a matter of law based on the TAC. |
| Do the claims seek to treat Salesforce as the publisher/speaker of third‑party content (thus barred by § 230)? | Claims focus on Salesforce’s own assistance and support, not publishing decisions; plaintiffs frame duties independent of third‑party content. | Claims attempt to hold Salesforce liable for harms traceable to Backpage ads—classic publisher‑based theory barred by § 230. | Held: Claims treat Salesforce as publisher/speaker and are barred by § 230. |
| Does FOSTA’s § 230(e)(5)(A) carve‑out remove § 230 immunity here? (Must defendant’s conduct itself violate § 1591?) | FOSTA exempts any § 1595 claim predicated on a § 1591 violation by the venture—defendant need not itself have committed § 1591 conduct. | The plain text requires that the “conduct underlying the claim” be the defendant’s conduct that would violate § 1591; otherwise the carve‑out would swallow § 230. | Held: FOSTA exempts only those § 1595 claims where the civil defendant’s conduct would constitute a § 1591 violation; Plaintiffs did not so allege, so exemption inapplicable. |
| Did Plaintiffs adequately plead § 1595 beneficiary liability (knowingly benefited; participated in venture; knew or should have known violation as to plaintiff)? | Salesforce knowingly benefited from and participated in Backpage’s trafficking enterprise through CRM sales/support; general knowledge of Backpage’s trafficking suffices. | Plaintiffs fail to allege Salesforce knew about G.G.’s specific trafficking or that Salesforce actively participated in the trafficking venture (beyond selling/supporting software). | Held: Plaintiffs failed to plead the required elements—no allegation Salesforce knew or should have known of G.G.’s specific trafficking and no plausible participation; claim fails on the merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading must be plausible)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standard for plausibility)
- Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666 (§ 230 protects online intermediaries from publisher liability)
- Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (§ 230 bars claims treating website as publisher of third‑party trafficking ads)
- Zango v. Kaspersky Lab, 568 F.3d 1169 (broad definition of interactive computer service not limited to public Internet hosts)
- Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (§ 230 is an affirmative defense; may be resolved on dismissal if complaint shows it)
- Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd., 821 F.3d 935 (plaintiff must plead facts that do not permit affirmative defense to dispose of claim at pleading stage)
- Doe v. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d 846 (failure‑to‑warn claims can avoid § 230 when liability does not depend on third‑party content)
- Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Doe, 21 F.4th 714 (§ 1595 requires knowledge as to the plaintiff’s trafficking venture to state claim)