820 F. Supp. 2d 261
D. Mass.2011Background
- Furtado worked for Standard Parking (MIT client) from 1999 to July 23, 2008, when terminated.
- He developed psychological problems beginning around 2001, including anxiety, depression, and PSTD, with formal treatment starting May 2008.
- Starting in 2007 he sought a day shift and other accommodations; no day-shift position existed for a night manager, though efforts to modify schedule continued.
- In 2008 Furtado received two discipline warnings (April and May) for work performance and safety issues, followed by a three-day suspension for excessive MIT Nextel charges.
- He began FMLA-eligible leave in July 2008 after submitting a physician’s certification; he took a two-week vacation starting July 13, 2008.
- Furtado was terminated July 23–24, 2008 for alleged misuse of the MIT Nextel cell phone; MCAD later found no probable cause for discrimination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disability discrimination under ADA/151B | Furtado is handicapped and qualified; termination was due to disability. | Misconduct (cell-phone overuse) and performance issues, not disability. | Summary judgment for Defendants; not a qualified handicapped person and no pretext. |
| Retaliation under ADA/151B | Termination was in response to requesting accommodations. | No causal link; misconduct and policy violations broke the chain. | Summary judgment for Defendants on retaliation claims. |
| Failure to accommodate (ADA/151B) | Defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodation (day shift). | No reasonable accommodation available; jurisdiction issue separate. | Court lacks jurisdiction over claims two and eight; even on merits, no reasonable accommodation. |
| Interference under MA 151B §4(4A) | Santiago/Hajjar interfered with rights to leave and accommodation. | No evidence of intent or rights-implicating action. | Dismissed for lack of deliberate disregard or intent. |
| Aiding and abetting under MA 151B §4(5) | Santiago/Hajjar aided discriminatory acts. | Derivative of underlying discrimination; no evidence of intent. | Dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (U.S. 2003) (context for burden shifting and summary judgment in discrimination)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (U.S. 1993) (preservation of ultimate burden on plaintiff after presumption)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (clarifies burden of proof at ultimate pretext stage)
- Freadman v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2007) (standard for prima facie case and pretext in First Circuit)
- Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001) (reassignment as reasonable accommodation under ADA not required to create a new job)
- Garrity v. United Airlines, Inc., 421 Mass. 55 (Mass. 1995) (Mass. law on qualified handicapped status and conduct prejudicial to employer)
- Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443 (Mass. 2002) (Mass. law on reasonable accommodation scope)