Furda v. State, 26 A.3d 918

Domestic dispute leads to police seizure of Furda's firearms and psychiatric evaluation; Furda released from Potomac Ridge Behavioral Health facility
Montgomery County Circuit Court issues a protective order prohibiting Furda from contacting his wife and surrendering firearms, effective Sept. 21, 2004 to Mar. 16, 2006
Furda violates the protective order in January 2005; court imposes suspended sentence and probation
On Oct. 31, 2007 Furda seeks return of property; Denial Order denies firearms, finding Furda a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) and Montgomery County code
On Jan. 24, 2008 Furda applies to purchase a firearm and answers Question 8 (Have you ever been adjudicated mentally defective or have you been committed to a mental institution?) with “No”; he is charged with perjury and false information; convictions affirmed by Maryland courts

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ambiguity of Question 8	Furda argues Question 8 is fundamentally ambiguous	State contends question is not impermissibly ambiguous due to context	Question 8 not fundamentally ambiguous; OR context supports meaning
Retroactive effect of appellate reversal on truth of the answer	Furda argues I reversal makes his answer truthful	State argues obligations to disclose binding order remain	No retroactive effect; Furda obligated to answer yes while Denial Order stood
Furda's intent to deceive	Furda believed Denial Order incorrect and lacked willful intent	Furda knowingly and willfully lied despite counsel’s warnings	Sufficient evidence of knowing and willful false statement; convictions affirmed
Scope of Question 8’s definition of 'committed'	Question 8's term ambiguous across federal/state/local definitions	Definition aligns with federal/state context and order language	Question 8 not impermissibly ambiguous; Furda understood the term to include the Denial Order
Effect of confusion or misreading due to circuit order language	Disagreement with circuit order should exonerate false statement	Failure to disclose the order itself constitutes false statement	Disclosures must reflect the status of orders; failure constitutes perjury

United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1978) (ambiguous questions not seen as per se defense to perjury)
United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) (ambiguity generally does not bar perjury unless entirely unreasonable understanding)
United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1986) (ambiguity determined by context and extrinsic evidence)
United States v. Camper, 384 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2004) (two plausible meanings, extrinsic evidence clarifies construction)
United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003) (considering context and extrinsic evidence in perjury)
United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 1995) (compound questions not always fundamentally ambiguous)
Roessner v. Mitchell, 122 Md. 460 (Md. 1914) (bindingness of judgments until overturned)
Da Silva v. Musso, 560 N.E.2d 1268 (N.Y. 1990) (final judgments remain effective until reversed)
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (policy of obedience to judicial orders)
Cassity v. United States, 521 F.2d 1320 (6th Cir. 1975) (regulation of disclosure penalties applies regardless of ultimate validity)