Funes v. VILLATORO, 352 S.W.3d 200

Villatoro and Canales sued the Funeses seeking a declaration that certain names were their trade names; the Funeses filed a counterclaim and sought sanctions, while the cases were consolidated and tried to a jury.
The jury found that Buenos Dias El Salvador and Festival Guanaco were Villatoro’s trade names, that the Funeses tortiously interfered with Villatoro’s contracts, and awarded damages and attorney’s fees.
Trial court granted directed verdicts in part, ultimately entered a final judgment awarding declaratory relief and other relief favorable to Villatoro, and the Funeses appealed.
Villatoro cross-appealed, challenging the denial of appellate attorney’s fees.
On appeal, the court (1) reversed in part and rendered/ remanded in part and (2) ultimately reversed the jury’s findings on trade-name ownership and injunction, while remanding/adjusting attorney’s fees under the UDJA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Trade-name Buenos Dias El Salvador ownership	Villatoro contends the name has secondary meaning.	Funeses argue no secondary meaning; name not Villatoro’s trade name.	Evidence insufficient for secondary meaning; Buenos Dias El Salvador not Villatoro’s trade name.
Trade-name Festival Guanaco ownership	Villatoro claims Festival Guanaco acquired secondary meaning.	Funeses argue no secondary meaning; not a trade name.	Evidence insufficient for secondary meaning; Festival Guanaco not Villatoro’s trade name.
Tortious interference with existing contracts	Villatoro argues Funeses intentionally interfered with existing advertisers.	No specific contracts or advertisers shown; no proof of interference.	Insufficient evidence of intentional interference with contracts; verdict reversed for this claim.
Injunctive relief and declaratory judgment	UDJA relief and injunction were proper to enforce ownership claims.	No valid ownership; declaratory/injunctive relief improper.	Declaratory relief and permanent injunction improper where ownership was not proven.
Attorney’s fees under UDJA and appellate fees	UDJA allows reasonable fees; fees appropriate for declaratory relief.	Fees should be tied to prevailing on declaratory relief; some are improper.	Remand to determine reasonable UDJA attorney’s fees; appellate fees addressed on remand.

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standard for legal sufficiency review in Texas)
L & F Distribs. v. Cruz, 941 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996) (binding charge submissions when not objected to)
Hirschfeld Steel Co. v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 201 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006) (unobjected legal instruction binds the parties)
Zapata Corp. v. Zapata Trading Int’l, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992) (evidence of secondary meaning may be established by multiple factors)
Douglas v. Taylor, 497 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973) (definition and evidence of secondary meaning)
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003) (standards for sufficiency of evidence in tort/antitrust contexts)
BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.1990) (UDJA and equitable relief boundaries)
MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2009) (UDJA attorney’s fees guidance; prevailing party not sole criterion)
Chase Home Fin., L.L.C. v. Cal West. Reconveyance Corp., 309 S.W.3d 619 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (attorney’s fees in declaratory judgments discretionary)